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Abstract
This thesis presents a new way of looking at and studying gentrification in light of the significant
differences of opinion on the subject still found in scholarship roughly 50 years after it first
appeared in scholarly literature. Understanding why gentrification does not occur may provide
the broadly accepted insights into the phenomenon that studies so far have failed to provide. To
initiate this new direction in the literature, I examine the case of Hartford, Connecticut, an old
former industrial town that has not gentrified despite having a strong presence of service industry
employment and many wealthy suburbs within its metropolitan region. Using the city’s own
plans of development and local media articles, this thesis looks at Hartford’s development
history from 1955 to 2011 for evidence as to why Hartford has not gentrified. Based on the
evidence I obtained, it appears that Hartford’s uniquely extreme subordination to its suburbs,
both politically and economically, has impeded gentrification by diminishing any benefits that
could accrue to Hartford during times of economic growth. In addition, it appears that the rentgap has yet to form in Hartford and that rehabilitation in the city has always been economically
difficult. Lastly, Hartford’s near-total devastation during the recession of the early 1990’s cut
short what may have been a time of gentrification, set the city back decades economically and
required it to completely rethink its economic place in the world. In the aftermath of this setback
the city can be seen to more clearly desire gentrification and its actions in Downtown may one
day lead to observable gentrification occurring in Hartford.
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Introduction:
From its inception as an urban development concept, gentrification has been a
controversial and contentious phenomenon. Up until the 1970’s, most scholars that studied urban
neighborhood processes had settled on theories that predicted, with few exceptions, consistent
neighborhood decline over time.1 The rapid decline of most older cities in advanced capitalist
societies and the growth of the new-build suburbs lent credence to these theories for decades.
Then, certain inner-city neighborhoods, American and European, unexpectedly experienced
sustained economic revival during the latter half of the 20th century, transforming into the highly
exclusive hubs of economic activity they are today. Without having a full grasp of what exactly
was occurring in these neighborhoods, popular and scholarly media dubbed it gentrification.
The unanticipated trend arguably put many scholars on the defensive, since it flew in the
face of predictions they had been making with a great deal of confidence, undermining their
credibility.2 At the same time, it empowered others to claim an opposite extreme, that
gentrification would spread to every urban neighborhood and reinvigorate America’s cities.3 As
time went on, and gentrification proved neither universal nor unambiguously positive for cities,
both sides have had to back off from their more absolutist views, but that early debate over the
nature and significance of gentrification has never been fully resolved. In their efforts to resolve
these questions, many scholars have, understandably, sought to answer the questions “what
causes gentrification to occur,”4 or more commonly, “what were the conditions of cities when

1

Beauregard, Robert. A. "Trajectories of Neighborhood Change: The Case of
Gentrification." Environment and Planning A 22, no. 7 (1990): 855-74. doi:10.1068/a220855.
2
Ibid. 855
3
Zavarella, Mario D. "The Back-To-The-City Movement Revisited." Journal of Urban Affairs 9, no. 4
(1987): 375-90. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9906.1987.tb00489.x.
4
Smith, Neil. "Toward a Theory of Gentrification A Back to the City Movement by Capital, Not
People." Journal of the American Planning Association 45, no. 4 (1979): 538-48.
doi:10.1080/01944367908977002.
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they began experiencing gentrification?”5 Those interested in urban development, but outside the
world of scholarship, such as city leaders, have eagerly attempted to apply the often-divergent
findings on gentrification in the hopes of revitalizing their cities. Therefore, there is a real-world
cost to the continued confusion and uncertainty surrounding gentrification.
After decades of intensive study of gentrification’s causes, our understanding of the
phenomenon is as concrete as it was when it first emerged in the literature. Indeed, one current
scholar of urban development has gone so far as to suggest that “it is often a mystery” why
people flock to some cities and not others and that “‘wise’ city leaders are really just lucky.”6
Thus, this thesis takes the opposite approach from most scholars. I do not seek to answer why
some cities gentrify – countless studies have tried already, with mixed results. Rather, my
question is, why have some cities never gentrified? In examining this question, I will focus on
Hartford, CT, which has struggled economically for decades despite some characteristics that,
according to other scholars, might make it a candidate for gentrification.
I argue that most of the forces working against gentrification occurring in Hartford are
found beyond the city’s boundaries. The most perennial cause is that the presence of robust
economic growth in some areas can preclude it from occurring in others. In this competition,
Hartford is outnumbered and outperformed by suburbs that are firmly integrated into Hartford’s
economic sphere but do not have to pay the city’s taxes or be constrained by its physical lack of
land for development. It is certainly evident from my research that the pull of the suburbs has
long been, and in many cases continues to be, stronger than the pull of the city. This is something

5

Lees, Loretta. "Gentrifying Down the Urban Hierarchy: The 'cascade Effect' in Portland, Maine."
In Small Cities: Urban Experience Beyond the Metropolis, edited by David Bell and Mark Jayne, 91-104.
Abingdon, NY: Routledge, 2006.
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Schragger, Richard C. City Power: Urban Governance in a Global Age. New York, NY: Oxford
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the city has tried to overcome for decades but it has had only limited success in retaining
resources it acquired prior to its decline. With each business and industry that left for the suburbs
or other cities, Hartford’s ability to build on its strengths diminished as well as its perception as a
successful city. Another external factor that has clearly played a role is economic recessions.
Gentrification is a form of economic growth and so it only makes sense that widespread
economic decline or slowing growth leads to a decline in gentrification. Economic recessions
stalled Hartford’s growth at critical junctures, including at times when the city appeared to be
gentrifying.7,8 Lastly, the one clear impediment to gentrification confined to Hartford’s
boundaries is its housing infrastructure, which has never been amenable to private rehabilitation
without the use of city funds to cover some of the costs. Such support really only became
available after the late 1990’s, and even then, it was necessarily limited by the funds available
and the extent of financial support needed to make rehabilitation economically viable.
To understand the absence of gentrification in Hartford, I begin by explaining what
qualifies as gentrification and what is believed to promote and discourage it. After, I will discuss
the consequences of gentrification for a sense of why it is so politically divisive. I will then
provide a brief overview of Hartford’s particular local context and history. Then, I will discuss
the theories I will use to analyze why gentrification is not occurring in Hartford. Together, these
sections will situate Hartford within theories of gentrification that it is rarely featured in,
explaining how it defies some conventions while being emblematic of others. These theories
provide a glimpse of what is at stake in debates over gentrification and how Hartford is not
completely immune to wider realities about gentrification. Lastly, they will show how
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Lees, Loretta, and Liz Bondi. "De-Gentrification And Economic Recession: The Case Of New York
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gentrification is not automatic. Instead, it is initiated by broader economic forces and promoted
by either the nature of the built environment or through political will.

Defining Gentrification
A major issue in the study of gentrification is that scholars never came to a consensus
on what its actual definition should be, or how to measure it. Nevertheless, there are several
reoccurring themes and concepts in gentrification research. By far the most consistently featured
component of gentrification is the displacement of the inner-city poor by middle and upper
income individuals.9,10 Displacement can occur for a wide variety of reasons, but the most
obvious and longest studied form is direct, physical displacement.
Physical displacement continues to be the most widely accepted criterion for determining
where gentrification has occurred.11 Broadly speaking, scholars can be split into two camps when
it comes to disputes over the particulars of gentrification: those who use a restrictive definition
and those who use an inclusive definition of gentrification.12 Adherents of the restrictive
definition only consider a neighborhood to be gentrifying if an influx of higher-income groups
move into formerly low-income neighborhoods and physically displace the lower income
population.13 In their view, it is not gentrification if the lower-income residents manage to
remain in the neighborhood, even if there is an influx of wealthier people. They would consider

Glass, Ruth. “Introduction: Aspects of Change.” In The Gentrification Debates, edited by Japonica
Brown-Saracino, 19-30. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.
10
Hackworth, Jason. "Postrecession Gentrification in New York City." Urban Affairs Review 37, no. 6
(2002): 815-43. doi:10.1177/107874037006003.
11
Bourne, L. S. "The Demise Of Gentrification? A Commentary And Prospective View." Urban
Geography 14, no. 1 (1993): 95-107. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.14.1.95.
12
Ibid. 96
13
Ibid. 97
9
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this either redevelopment14 or “positive gentrification.”15 These scholars often find that
gentrification receives far too much attention compared to its real-world significance and blame
those who use the term more liberally.16
Adherents of the inclusive definition consider any neighborhood to be gentrifying if
there is an influx of wealthy newcomers coinciding with rapid economic growth and a changing
built environment. Physical displacement is not a necessary component, nor does the
neighborhood need to be predominantly lower-income.17 For example, the displacement of the
middle-income families by upper-income families in Brooklyn Heights has been dubbed “supergentrification.”18 Development that occurs in abandoned industrial areas or on undeveloped land
can also be considered gentrification by some definitions, even though there is no community
that is directly displaced.19 With such a wide gulf between the two schools of thought, it is little
surprise that opposite conclusions have been reached about gentrification’s significance and
prevalence. At one extreme, scholars have found evidence that suggests gentrification will
transform urban structures and make suburbanization seem like a historical anomaly.20 On the
other, scholars have found evidence that gentrification itself is the historical anomaly and that
suburbanization and inner-city decline are hardly offset by it.21 Gentrification is also popularly
associated with certain racial dynamics, namely the residential displacement of urban racial

14

Ibid. 97
Davidson, Mark. "Spoiled Mixture: Where Does State-led `Positive Gentrification End?" Urban
Studies 45, no. 12 (June 2008): 2385-405. doi:10.1177/0042098008097105.
16
Beauregard, Robert A. "Politics, Ideology and Theories of Gentrification." Journal of Urban Affairs 7,
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Bourne. 97
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Lees, Loretta. “Super Gentrification: The Case of Brooklyn Heights, New York City.” In The
Gentrification Debates. 45-50.
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Bourne. 97
20
Lees, Loretta, and Liz Bondi. "De-Gentrification And Economic Recession: The Case Of New York
City." Urban Geography 16, no. 3 (1995): 234-53. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.16.3.234.
21
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minorities by suburban non-Hispanic whites or “racial turnover”.22 However, many scholars
would not go so far as to say racial turnover must occur for something to be considered
gentrification as it occurs with much less consistency and clarity than popular portrayals would
make it seem.23 Still, by virtue of the correlation between racial and economic status in the U.S.,
the potential for racial turnover cannot be discounted entirely and would be more likely to occur
the more racial characteristics overlap with economic status.
Fortunately, the definition debate does not need to be resolved here because Hartford’s
neighborhoods would not be considered gentrified in even the broadest definitions of the term.
While signs of gentrification in the city have been reported in decades’ past,24 high
unemployment, low levels of homeownership, significant poverty and other signs of economic
decline point to a city that has not experienced gentrification. Nevertheless, my conception of
gentrification will be based on the following definition: “the process by which central urban
neighborhoods that have undergone disinvestments and economic decline experience a reversal,
reinvestment, and the in-migration of a relatively well-off middle- and upper middle-class
population.”25 The actual causes of this process are not all agreed upon, but several theories have
significant support in the literature.
Factors Promoting Gentrification
One of the oldest and persistent explanations for gentrification relies on a “cultural”
approach to the phenomenon.26 My own hypotheses about gentrification do not rely on these

22

Hwang, Jackelyn, and Robert J. Sampson. "Divergent Pathways of Gentrification." American
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cultural understandings as I have the found the explanations to be less convincing and solidly
grounded than theories based on economics and legal structures. However, since they have been
a persistent element from gentrification’s earliest days to today, it is worth discussing the cultural
explanations in broad terms. Essentially, the idea is that some neighborhoods have a je ne sais
quoi that attracts particular groups, such as artists27 or gays and lesbians.28 In the latter case the
term “pink economy” has even been coined due to the supposed ability of gay enclaves to form
their own distinct, lucrative segment of the market.29
More recently, the scholar Richard Florida has put forward the theory that these and
other supposedly more open and tolerant groups form an important “Creative Community.”30 An
elementary part of Florida’s Creative Community idea is that cities, in the current economy, have
to focus more on creating a good people climate and less on a good business climate, although
the latter is still important.31 Of course, the goal of creating a good people climate is attracting a
vaguely defined group of “creative” people to cities.32 This isn’t necessarily code for white
people since diversity is apparently highly valued by creative people.33 Florida even expresses a
dislike for gentrification, but his grand theory of city development would seem to put cities on an
inevitable collision course with gentrification.34 This is in many ways consistent with the
findings of other scholars taking a cultural approach. What begins as “authentic”35 enclaves of

Zukin, Sharon. “From Arts Production to Housing Market.” In The Gentrification Debates, edited by
Japonica Brown-Saracino, 119-126. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.
28
Sibalis, Michael. “Urban Space and Homosexuality: The Example of the Marais, Paris’ Gay Ghetto,”
In The Gentrification Debates. 221-234.
29
Ibid. 227.
30
Florida, Richard. "Building the Creative Community." In The Gentrification Debates. 345-54.
31
Ibid. 351
32
Ibid. 351
33
Ibid. 351
34
Ibid. 351
35
Brown-Saracino, Japonica. “Social Preservationists and the Quest for Authentic Community.” In The
Gentrification Debates. 261-275.
27
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“gritty”36 city life eventually gives way to gentrification, much to the chagrin of the very
“creative” people who helped put the neighborhood on the map and are perhaps more responsible
than anyone for the gentrification they bemoan. I nevertheless find these explanations wanting, if
for no other reason that every struggling city is “gritty” and “authentic,” insofar as they
physically cannot afford to be anything else, but they do not all gentrify. Moreover, the notion
that having certain groups, who are defined by non-economic qualities, reliably leads to
economic revivals seems extremely tenuous.
In contrast to cultural theories, my understanding of gentrification’s causes is
significantly informed by the influential “rent-gap theory.”37 According to it, gentrification and
physical displacement occur because developers are attracted to inner-cities with depressed land
values and inexpensive buildings. Theoretically, these central parcels of land could be quite
valuable if they were just well maintained or rebuilt.38 After successful redevelopment, land and
building values should increase until the inner city is once again wealthy and highly valued.
However, many lower-income city residents are renters that, because they do not own the land
they live on, do not benefit from this rise in value.39 In fact, the rise in land values tends to result
in increasing rents that become prohibitive and force the poor to move to neighborhoods that
have not yet gentrified, perhaps even out of the city altogether.40 They are replaced by luxury
condominiums, upscale restaurants and other amenities that only those in the middle and upper
income bracket can afford. Admittedly, this particular theory has been challenged41 and revised42

Lloyd, Richard. “Living Like an Artist.” In The Gentrification Debates. 185-194
Smith. "Toward a Theory of Gentrification A Back to the City Movement by Capital, Not People." 53848.
38
Ibid. 545
39
Ibid. 547
40
Ibid. 547
41
Beauregard. "Politics, Ideology and Theories of Gentrification." 51-9
42
Hackworth. 818
36
37
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on multiple grounds. However, I hypothesize that one cause of Hartford’s lack of gentrification
is that an economic situation such as the rent-gap has yet to emerge. Thus, the kind of private
rehabilitation that would make Hartford’s neighborhoods more amenable to upper-income
individuals, and would not require much funding from the struggling local government, never
occurred.
Another strain of thought that is related to the spread of gentrification is the concept of
historically distinct waves of gentrification, often applied to major US cities.43,44 Thus far, a total
of three waves of gentrification have been identified, with transition periods in between each.45
According to the theory, the first wave began in the late 1960’s and ended in the mid 1970’s.
During this wave, gentrification was not a large-scale enterprise and was led by individual
gentrifiers taking advantage of the rent-gap in neighborhoods that required little effort to
revitalize.46 The second wave emerged out of the economic recession of the mid-1970’s, was far
more widespread than the first wave and witnessed more intense political struggles over
displacement than any other wave.47 Lastly, the present and third wave emerged out of a
recession in the early 1990’s in which gentrification came to a halt in many neighborhoods.48 It
is considered the most aggressive and widespread wave of gentrification.49 The emergence of
both waves supports the notion that economic decline is a prerequisite for gentrification, and that
the amount of gentrification may even increase when the decline is more significant.50 Most

43

Hackworth. 818
Hackworth, Jason, and Neil Smith. "The Changing State of Gentrification." Tijdschrift Voor
Economische En Sociale Geografie 92, no. 4 (2001): 464-77. doi:10.1111/1467-9663.00172.
45
Ibid. 466-468
46
Ibid. 466-68
47
Ibid. 466-68
48
Ibid. 466-68
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Ibid. 466-68
50
Lees and Bondi. 235
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importantly, the theory holds that the current wave of gentrification is dependent on state support
to a degree not seen in the earlier waves.51 In fact, it is argued that, because the neighborhoods
most amenable to redevelopment have already gentrified, private developers require state support
because of the risk inherent in the neighborhoods they are now investing in.52 This theory is
disputed for, among other things, too rigidly confining particular forms of gentrification to
particular time periods.53 However, it is still a useful theory because it establishes that economic
recessions can have a broad and inhibitory effect on gentrification; gentrification can occur in a
wide variety of ways; and that we should expect gentrification today to be a largely state-backed
undertaking that is occurring in less logical locations, since the risk is underwritten by the state.
Perhaps most importantly, this theory of gentrification indicates that conscious attempts at
gentrification by Hartford’s leadership should be less evident early on and become more
prevalent since the 1990’s.
The great change underlying the difference between post 1990’s gentrification and that
which came before was the replacement of Keynesian policies by neoliberal ones. This shift had
begun in the 1980’s, but became cemented after the 1990’s recession. Keynesian economic
theory created a significant role for governments as socially responsible institutions whose
intervention was necessary to mitigate the amount of inequality the free market would create
(Smith 2002).54 Thus, prior to the 1980’s, the state was much more involved and generous in
providing housing, welfare and other amenities.55 Relatedly, gentrification occurred mostly as a

51

Hackworth and Smith. 469
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53
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trickle under very particular circumstances during this time.56 By contrast, neoliberalism rests on
two assumptions, that individuals pursuing their own self-interest leads to the optimal situation
for society as a whole and that the market knows best.57 The realization of the negative-sum
game that devolution and decentralization produces is what scholars have called the
“entrepreneurial state,” a municipality dominated by neoliberal ideology and market impulses, as
opposed to concerns for social welfare and reproduction.58 The rise of the entrepreneurial state is
crucial for the spread of gentrification and has been a definitive feature of the current “third
wave” of gentrification.59
During the era of Keynesian dominance, normative arguments that relied on placing
equity and community before economic growth were more salient and forceful in policy
circles.60 Current political and economic realities make it much less likely that local governments
will intervene on behalf of gentrification’s opponents, as was crucial in many successful efforts
to halt gentrification in the 1970’s and 80’s.61,62,63 It is not that local governments are necessarily
vindictive towards the poor, though they can be,64 but the devolution of responsibilities has put
such economic strain on cities that they have to look for sources of revenue wherever they can. 65
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Even the most ruthlessly entrepreneurial city governments still struggle with debt caused by
devolution and the mismatch of resources and responsibilities.66
Neoliberalism is such a radically pro-market and anti-government ideology that
anything that makes government too weak to effectively regulate the market is usually
characterized as promoting freedom and good economic policy.67 Thus, neoliberal ideology has
supported the devolution of responsibility from central governments to regional and local
governments.68,69 According to the theory, smaller units of government are inherently more
legitimate than larger, centralized units, whether regional or national.70 Supposedly, a balkanized
system of many small, local governments, like that of Connecticut’s municipalities, is ideal for
economic and administrative efficiency.71 The competition that develops between uncooperative
municipalities is a feature, not a defect, of the system because the competition is what makes the
local governments more economically efficient.72 The greater number of municipalities is also
considered better for democracy as it allows for greater consumer choice than centralized
systems.73 In essence, the government is treated as a business that sells social services and
amenities. Inefficient governments are like struggling businesses, and instead of being artificially
propped up, they should be allowed to fail because they will never learn fiscal responsibility if
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they do not suffer the consequences of mismanagement.74 City residents are like customers and it
is assumed that they can simply leave their current municipality and move to another, as though
they are going to a shop across the street because the one they are currently in has terrible
service.75
Devolution is particularly rampant in the U.S., in part because the territorialized,
federal system of semi-autonomous, sovereign states already created the sort of subnational
inequities and competition for resources even before the rise of neoliberalism.76 Thus, whereas in
other countries regionalism is a sign of devolution,77 it is the counter-narrative to devolution in
the U.S.78 Advocates of regionalism emphasize that, while devolution might generate more
economic growth overall, the growth is distributed in a highly unequal manner.79 Another
regionalist argument, that works within the dialectic of neoliberalism, is that globalization has
made municipal competition a negative-sum game.80 Therefore, faced with increased global
competition, municipalities cannot afford to be undermining each other and actually need to
cooperate to have any hope of succeeding in a hyper-competitive world market.81
In the midst of all this competition and runaway economic development, some cities are
simply ignored or left behind by financial markets that evidently do not consider them good
investments.82 Thus, devolution and neoliberalism simultaneously promote and impede

74

Stansel 66-7.
Tiebout, Charles “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” Journal of Political Economy 64, no.5 (1956):
416-424.
76
Markusen. 4
77
Rodriguez-Pose and Gill. 339
78
Rojas, Jason and Lyle Wray. “Metropolitan Hartford: Regional Challenges and Responses.” In
Confronting Urban Legacy: Rediscovering Hartford and New England’s Forgotten Cities. Edited by
Xiangming Chen and Nick Bacon. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
79
Ibid. 239
80
Levine. 191
81
Ibid. 188
82
Ibid. 195
75

17

gentrification in cities. Those cities that “win” the competition for attention from corporate
interests are likely to become heavily gentrified, while those that do not attract enough interest
from private investors rarely have the capital to underwrite significant redevelopment projects
that risk encouraging gentrification. In the case of Hartford, I hypothesize that Tiebout’s theory
about municipality shopping has proven only half true, much to Hartford’s detriment. It has
continually been on the “losing” side of economic competitions, global and regional, and has
experienced population loss and out-migration as a result. Where Tiebout’s theory is shown to be
inaccurate, it is in the context of Hartford’s losses depriving the city of the resources needed to
maintain even basic, mandatory services such as education. Hartford’s situation demonstrates
how competition with suburbs cannot “discipline” the city because for Hartford to learn
discipline there would have to be a clear course of action Hartford has not taken that would
improve its standing relative to the suburbs. This would mean the solutions to Hartford’s
economic woes are known and that the city has nevertheless refused to act upon them for
ideological or non-economic reasons, which is highly doubtful.
Admittedly, there is a possibility that at least some Hartford residents would hope to
avoid strategies that might make Hartford more economically competitive if they also increased
its odds of gentrifying. Gentrification is not without negative consequences and even its benefits
are often provided unequally. Still, those most vulnerable to the negative aspects of gentrification
would be Hartford’s poorest and most insecure populations. It is unlikely that individuals in this
population would be able to control Hartford’s policy decisions. Perhaps this could happen if
they had powerful allies in city hall willing to sacrifice their own potential prosperity for
egalitarian ideals, but the poor are less likely to have such valuable political connections. Heated
debates might occur over the impact of certain developments but city leadership in general, and
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Hartford is no exception, is more likely to focus on the positives of gentrification for the whole
city than the negative consequences for some families.
Consequences of Gentrification
When gentrification was first recognized, physical displacement of the poor was seen
as the primary exception to what was an otherwise welcome economic development.83 However,
just like gentrification in general, some scholars set out to prove that physical displacement was
also a relatively insignificant phenomenon. Consequently, gentrification-induced displacement is
a disputed concept within a disputed concept.84,85,86 Gentrification is a heavily politicized topic
and some argue that scholarship that discounts physical displacement has become a cover for
politicians to pursue policies of “social-mix” that make cities more amenable to the wealthy
while claiming that everyone will benefit.87 Gentrification proponents argue that with higher
income individuals leading in neighborhoods, the benefits will be shared among people of
different classes because more businesses will be attracted to the community, the middle-class
will be more effective at demanding better services from the city, and contact with the higherincome individuals might help the lower-income individuals tap into more resourceful social
networks.88
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True to the basic tenor of gentrification research, counterarguments strongly question
the likelihood of any of the benefits social mix advocates claim. For one, social mix assumes that
the relationship between the lower and middle-income groups will be defined by harmony and
trust, not distrust and discord, as has often been the case. 89,90 In such situations, where one or
more sides distrusts the stated, benign motives of the other, every new development can turn into
a bitter dispute, even if the issue is more symbolic than substantive.91 These conflicts can lead to
emotional distress and eventually even physical displacement,92 especially when the middleincome population grows large enough relative to the lower-income population that they are able
to speak for and represent “the community” in local government.93
Known as political displacement, middle-income domination of local politics can lead to
the enactment of policies that are directly at odds with the interest of the poor, such as increased
policing of “quality of life” crimes like loitering or homelessness.94 The exclusion of the poor
from the political realm often leads to their marginalization in the newly constructed cultural and
social identity of the neighborhood. The viewpoint of middle-income individuals on what is and
is not appropriate for the neighborhood becomes the only viewpoint that is reflected in the public
sphere. Thus, social, cultural and economic venues associated with undesirable elements are
aggressively removed from the neighborhood and replaced with more acceptable venues.95,96
When lower-income individuals perceive these changes as personal attacks on their own way of
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life, they can become so alienated from their own neighborhoods that they move to find a less
hostile community.97 Therefore, even without direct, immediate physical displacement due to
issues of development and affordability, gentrification often causes class conflicts to boil over as
people with higher incomes increasingly claim ownership of lower-income neighborhoods.
There have been times, less so in recent years, when conflict and hostility to
gentrification and its consequences had a chilling effect on it occurring. Since gentrification is
far from guaranteed to occur in any given city or neighborhood, any impediments to it once it
actually gets under way could succeed in halting or limiting its reach. Yet, in the grand scheme
of things, there are numerous potential impediments to gentrification beyond mere resistance by
low-income communities and many of these have proven more significant hindrances.
Impediments to Gentrification
Some commonly identified gentrification deterrents are affordable housing projects, 98 a
higher proportion of racial and ethnic minorities,99 perceptions of crime and disorder,100 and, for
gentrifying families, poor school systems.101 Among the most well studied and obvious reasons
gentrification fails to occur in certain neighborhoods is that the local community is highly
mobilized, politically engaged and unwilling to be displaced without a fight. Particularly during
the 1970’s and 80’s, community protest and political activism halted the advance of
gentrification in major cities like San Francisco, New York and Boston.102,103 Depending on the
situation, so-called “antigrowth movements”104 use anything at their disposal to combat
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gentrification, though they are most effective when assisted by sympathetic politicians or
government agencies.105,106,107,108 Indeed, when governments are unsympathetic or hostile to
community antigrowth efforts, even well-organized community organizations tend to fail in the
final count.109 This may explain the noted lack of formidable community resistance to
gentrification in recent years, as governments at all levels are far more likely to favor economic
growth over the social preservation of the poor.110 Even communities that successfully resisted
earlier attempts at gentrification have succumbed to it rather quietly since the start of the “third
wave” of gentrification in the 1990’s.111
Fortunately for neighborhoods that do not wish to gentrify, the legacy of past antigrowth
activity may be enough to deter investors on its own. In particular, the presence of significant
public housing projects has been consistently identified as a hindrance to gentrification.112,113
Indeed, gentrification has occurred in many cities only after strong local governments pursued an
aggressive policy of demolishing neighborhoods with significant public housing and converting
them into “mixed-income” areas.114,115 By contrast, one particularly effective community
organization intentionally placed non-aesthetic housing projects on the boundaries of its district
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to deter gentrification.116 Community Land Trusts (CLT) are also an important legacy in select
neighborhoods that created them. CLTs place control of the land outside of the control of the
market or the state and ensure affordability through internal regulations.117 Lastly, and somewhat
ironically, communities can utilize stigma to their own benefit. Poor communities, especially
those of color, are often associated with crime and disorder, which can deter gentrifiers and
investors (Hwang & Sampson 2014).118 Local minority residents can utilize the willingness of
suburbanites and whites to believe they are violent, suspicious characters to create a sense that
the neighborhood is “ready-to-rumble” should they try to gentrify the area.119
In addition to locally specific impediments like affordable housing projects, gentrification
can also be limited by broader economic forces like recessions. However, it appears that not all
recessions have a negative effect on gentrification, at least to an equal degree. A recession in
Canada during the 1980’s appears not to have impeded gentrification, at least in cities that had
significant amount of employment in advanced services.120 This suggests that the particular
nature of the recession is important, as sectors of the economy that are relatively unaffected may
be able to continue the gentrification process.
Yet, perhaps the single most important recession in the history of gentrification
occurred from around 1989 to 1993.121 Urban scholars have not seemed interested in
understanding why, but this recession had such an impact on gentrification that scholars during
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and shortly after it were writing about the end of gentrification and “de-gentrification.”122,123
Evidently, gentrification was stopped dead in its tracks, and even receded in some cases.124
Therefore, the force with which this recession hit in some cities may have wiped out any
gentrification that might have occurred from the 1970’s to 1980’s. If economic powerhouses like
New York saw gentrification decline for years, then it stands to reason that cities with far less
economic strength could have seen gentrification drop off for much longer, possibly even ending
altogether.
All of the impediments mentioned have merit, but it is evident that none of them can
stand alone and explain why urban neighborhoods have not gentrified. For instance, so-called
“dis-amenities,”125 can be found in practically every neighborhood that has ever gentrified. In
addition, the neighborhoods that successfully resisted gentrification in earlier waves were one of
the last non-gentrified neighborhoods left in their cities and some of these very neighborhoods
still gentrified, just at a later time.126 Therefore, there must be a combination of inhibiting factors
that explains why some poor, minority-majority neighborhoods gentrify while others do not.
Based on the literature, the most important factors inhibiting gentrification are the ever-present
competition for resources between municipalities, the economic damage caused by severe
recessions and the underlying inability to rehabilitate old, deteriorating properties for a profit
without government assistance. I will examine these factors more closely in the context of
Hartford.
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Hartford is a useful case study for understanding why cities do not gentrify because it is
representative of the many old, former industrial towns that have also not experienced
gentrification. The New England region is dotted with towns with a fairly similar back-story and
economic outlook to Hartford, such as Worcester, Lowell and Springfield, Massachusetts.
Studying these urban areas from an urban development context is crucial because scholarship has
tended to ignore cities on the scale of Hartford and other so-called middle-sized cities.127 More
recent scholarship has sought to address this deficiency,128 but metropolises like New York and
San Francisco continue to be the most studied cities, especially when gentrification is
considered. In choosing to study the most obviously gentrified and most economically powerful
cities, studies of gentrification may have inadvertently exaggerated how widespread of a
phenomenon gentrification truly is, as some critics suggest.129 Therefore, studying these smaller
cities may provide a better sense of the true strength of gentrification as an economic force. In
addition, examining why an entire city does not experience sustained gentrification is completely
novel. Gentrification is typically approached as a neighborhood process and as a result, even
studies that examine why specific neighborhoods have not gentrified occur in the context of a
city that is experiencing gentrification in other neighborhoods.130 By contrast, Hartford has
neighborhoods with suburban style, single-family detached homes and it is often the case that
they would be losing population if not for the in-movement of minorities from other parts of
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Hartford.131,132 Lastly, by gaining a better understanding of what has prevented gentrification in
cities that are not terribly different from others where gentrification has occurred, it should be
possible to gain a better understanding of gentrification overall. Since attempts to understand
why gentrification occurs have not satisfactorily addressed the controversy, it is time to explore a
new approach to the phenomenon.
The Local Context
Scholars have concluded that unique local conditions have a significant impact on how
gentrification does, or does not occur.133’134 Therefore, general theories of gentrification can only
explain so much without accounting for Hartford’s historical and present context. Hartford is
only 18 square miles, which is small even by New England standards (Chen & Bacon 2013).135
While other cities have grown by annexing suburbs, including New England cities like Boston,
Hartford has actually shrunk since it was never able to annex its suburbs and West Hartford
actually separated from it in 1854.136 This has serious implications for economic growth because
the city relies on property taxes for revenue and there is not much property to tax in such a small
city. The situation is further compounded by the fact that much of the city’s land is tax exempt
due to the presence of state government buildings, hospitals, and universities, so the city has
even less revenue generating power than its size would imply. At the same time, Hartford has
been uniquely endowed with a cluster of insurance providers, including a Fortune 500 company,
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and is the core city of one of the wealthiest Metropolitan Areas in the world.137 Thus, it should,
in some ways, have been more likely to experience gentrification than other disinvested New
England cities, as there has long been substantial capital in the area that could be reinvested in
the city. In fact, the local business elite and the state of Connecticut have made numerous efforts
to revive Hartford’s economy since the 1970’s.138 Yet, some of Hartford’s greatest revitalization
attempts would also be its most visible failures and disappointments. The city has remained
stubbornly in between stagnation and decline in spite of these efforts.
Two aspects of Hartford and the Hartford region were dominant throughout most of its
history but have arguably weakened in recent decades. One of these aspects is that Hartford is
situated in a state and region where localism is deeply ingrained, as the secession of West
Hartford exemplifies.139 In 1960, the state of Connecticut decided to make the death of
regionalism official by abolishing county governments altogether.140 As a result, efforts to
approach economic issues on a more regional basis usually fail as suburbs, and to some extent
Hartford itself, have a long history of independent decision making that they are unwilling to
relinquish.141 The other aspect, is that Hartford once had a strong manufacturing base and a
stronger base in financial and insurance industries. Hartford was home to such famous
manufacturers as Colt, Pratt & Whitney, Underwood Typewriters and the company that would
later become United Airlines.142 Nevertheless, there were underlying weaknesses in Hartford’s

137

Chen, Xiangming, and Nick Bacon. Confronting Urban Legacy: Rediscovering Hartford and New
England’s Forgotten Cities. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. 6
138
Ibid. 37-41.
139
Condon. 264
140
McKee, Clyde. “Mike Peters and the Legacy of Leadership in Hartford, Connecticut." In Governing
Middle-sized Cities: Studies in Mayoral Leadership. 31
141
Rojas and Wray. 241-2
142
Walsh, Andrew. “Hartford: A Global History.” In Confronting Urban Legacy: Rediscovering Hartford
and New England’s Forgotten Cities. 21-45.

27

prosperity even then, in that the city had a large, low-skilled working class population that would
struggle to find employment outside of these industries. Thus, two important Hartford legacies
are thwarted regional ambitions and an extreme mismatch between the kinds of jobs available in
Hartford and the skills of those who live in Hartford.
Following urban renewal in the 1950’s and 60’s, Hartford had several experiences with
attempts at economic development that had the potential to cause gentrification but did not. The
first major attempt to redevelop Hartford after urban renewal occurred in the early to mid1970’s. Hartford’s business community at the time, referred to as “the Bishops,”143,144 took the
lead on this project and created the Greater Hartford Process, also known as Process, to
coordinate development. They decided to lead this effort because, in addition to being incredibly
difficult to navigate,145 Hartford’s local government had pursued a policy of urban renewal that,
if anything, hastened Hartford’s decline.
Improving the economy is a constant concern for any government, indeed, it is what
makes gentrification so alluring to some, and it can be assumed that projects are under way even
if they are not grand in scale. Various actors in Hartford’s history have tried to counteract its
negative economic trends in large and small ways for decades. It is worth observing whether they
appear to have made any progress. The area that Hartford’s leaders have clearly had the least
success is in reversing or halting the demographic trends that have taken place since the 1950’s.
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Figure 1: Non-Hispanic white population of Hartford and its western and eastern suburbs over
time. Courtesy of Social Explorer. Data provided by U.S. Census Bureau and American
Community Survey.
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of how Hartford’s white population has declined
significantly since the 1950’s. Unfortunately, racial categories in the Census have changed
significantly since 1950, so it is only in 1980 that it is possible to separate white Hispanics from
non-Hispanic whites. However, in 1950, the white population broadly should represent the non29

Hispanic white population fairly well since the community had a much smaller presence in the
city. That said, it is clear that there has been no significant rebounds of the non-Hispanic white
population in any of Hartford’s census tracts. The census tract comprising Downtown (the
central tract on Hartford’s eastern border) may be the only exception but it is hard to tell as it
was divided into several tracts as recently as 1990. Some tracts, mainly on Hartford’s western
border, have consistently retained the largest percentages of non-Hispanic white population
throughout the period under study. However, it is quite astonishing how few of Hartford’s tracts
are even 30% or more non-Hispanic white in 2017. North Hartford clearly comes across as the
historical and current epicenter of heavily concentrated minority populations in Hartford, with
the Arsenal area having a more than 90% African American population as early as 1950. Since
then, that reality has spread throughout most Hartford neighborhoods north of the I-84 highway.
Interestingly, it is not only within Hartford that the minority population appears to grow. The
suburbs immediately around Hartford have also become less and less white, most evidently since
2000. This is most evident in East Hartford, which is more like Hartford in its economic
situation, but the minority population in West Hartford has also clearly grown in many of its
census tracts. Those on the border of Hartford appear most strongly affected by this growing
minority population. Since Hartford contains the vast majority of the region’s minority
population, this suggests out-migration of minorities from Hartford to the suburbs. Yet, without a
corresponding rise in Hartford’s white population, indeed it continues to shrink, this suggests
Hartford’s population is not leaving because of displacement from gentrification, but because
more minorities simply have the ability to leave for the suburbs.146
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One census tract in the North deserves clarification, as it appears to lose white population
from 1980 to 2000 and then regain it from 2000 to 2017. I had to conclude that this was simply an
anomaly or census error because neither experts on Hartford’s history nor archival sources reference any
such demographic turnover in that area, which, given how substantial it appears in the data, one would
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While demographics are a fairly good indicator of gentrification, especially in a
metropolitan region as racially and socioeconomically segregated as Hartford’s, median
household income is also important to observe. It is another key figure when assessing a city or
neighborhood’s economic well-being.

expect. Based on the fact that the loss of white population coincides with a loss of total population in the
thousands it appears that somehow the white population just was not accurately counted that year. When
the population resurges in the next available census the white population is back to where it was before
2000, reinforcing the idea that some sort of error occurred.
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Figure 2: Hartford’s median household income from 1990 to 2017 (not adjusted for inflation).
Courtesy of Social Explorer. Data provided by U.S. Census Bureau and American Community
Survey.
While Figure 2 is not adjusted for inflation, it is still useful for the main purpose of
comparing Hartford’s economic fortunes to that of its surrounding suburbs. The relationship
between the city and its suburbs is such a dominant theme in any discussion of Hartford’s
economic potential that its economic status relative to the suburbs is more important information
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than the specific dollar amount at today’s inflation rate. Unfortunately, displays of median
household income for the city’s census tracts are not available prior to 1980, but Figure 2 at least
provides a look at the last 30 years of Hartford’s economy. Notably, median household incomes
for most census tracts in 1990 pale in comparison to most suburban tracts. Perhaps the recession
was already registering in the census data, but archival evidence supports the notion that incomes
for Hartford residents did not actually improve during the prosperous decade of the 1980’s. It is
also evident that many of the census tracts with the largest median household incomes also had
the largest non-Hispanic white populations, supporting the use of demographic information as a
rough proxy for socioeconomic status. It is clearly imperfect as a proxy, as Figure 2 shows that
some tracts with a high minority concentration still have relatively good median household
incomes. West Hartford, in particular, appears to be seeing growth in most of its census tracts
even as its minority population becomes more significant. Lastly, it is evident that the economic
strength of Hartford’s Downtown is not entirely gone and continues to outperform the census
tracts on its southern and western borders in terms of median household income. Still, it does not
appear to be a guaranteed march towards greater wealth as median household income actually
declines in the Downtown from 2010 to 2017. Also, Hartford’s Downtown has an extremely
small residential population, which the city is actively trying to change, but in the meantime the
significance of its economic success for actual Hartford residents is unclear.
Therefore, if there was any doubt as to whether Hartford has experienced gentrification,
this brief overview of its demographic and economic situation over time should make it clear that
once Hartford’s decline began in the 1950’s nothing has reversed it for long. It has only fallen
further and further behind its suburbs in terms of its percentage of white population and, to a
lesser extent, its median income. Yet, the census data cannot provide the whole story for
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Hartford’s decline. For one, demographic categories have changed substantially over time, as
have census tracts themselves, making the kind of decades-long examination I want to perform
incredibly difficult. Raw data also cannot tell me anything about the goals of Hartford’s leaders
at the time and what they considered Hartford’s strengths and weaknesses and their own failures
and successes. Consequently, I will perform content analysis in order to get a better sense of the
story of Hartford’s decline and attempts to revitalize.
Methods
In order to determine the underlying causes of Hartford’s lack of gentrification, I will
examine the economic development strategies pursued by the city of Hartford. Through content
analysis, I searched for evidence of the likely causes I identified as preventing Hartford’s
gentrification. As I suspected, the evidence points to Hartford’s relationship with its suburbs
being highly competitive, and to Hartford’s disadvantage, for decades. The archives also contain
numerous instances of Hartford’s housing infrastructure being unfit for rehabilitation by purely
market forces, forcing the city to either pay part of the cost of rehabilitation, demolish the
structure or allow it to decay and become abandoned. Last, but not least, two particular economic
recessions in the 1970’s and 1990’s ended periods of significant privately funded development
that might have led to gentrification if they had not been cut short.
In order to test my hypotheses, I analyzed the Plans of Development produced by
Hartford’s Commission on the City Plan (the Commission) and later its Planning and Zoning
Commission (PZC). Hartford’s Commission on the City Plan was formed in 1907 and was the
first permanent planning commission in the United States.147 Similar to its modern-day
equivalent, the Commission was responsible for both drawing up city plans and zoning
147
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ordinances. Ironically, this does not mean development in Hartford occurred in an orderly
fashion since 1907. Indeed, by the time the Commission was established most of Hartford was
already developed, giving it little opportunity to direct growth before unplanned development
became entrenched.148 It is likely because the city had developed in such a disorderly fashion that
the Commission was created. The Commission’s composition changed significantly over time
since Hartford has undergone several major changes in its general governmental structure since
1907. As implied above, it actually does not exist under the same name anymore and has become
the Planning and Zoning Commission since the charter was reformed in 2002. Hartford’s charter
was significantly changed two other times, in 1947 and 1967, the former creating the nonpartisan council-manager system in place for the earliest period under study and the latter
reintroducing partisanship and an independent office for mayor.149 I am only concerned with the
Commission from the 1950’s onward and it appears that the Commission was comprised of
political appointees, appointed by the mayor or city manager, who tended to have some relevant
experience in planning, such as being an architect. Still, lawyers, educators, doctors and
reverends also appear on the Commission so it is likely that anyone significantly engaged in
Hartford’s internal affairs, as a member of the Democratic town committee for instance, could be
appointed to a position on the Commission.150
Coincidentally, the Commission would produce its first general plan for the city in 1955,
perfect for the period under study. It had produced some larger plans between 1907 and 1955 but
they only dealt with specific projects or aspects of the city,151 as opposed to proposing general
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goals for the city. Including the one from 1955, the Commission on the City Plan and Planning
and Zoning Commission have produced five Plans of Development. Unfortunately, two of the
plans, from 1955 and 1972 respectively, were not officially adopted by the City Council, which
appears to have had an unclear but negative impact on the proposed development strategies being
carried out.152 It seems as though the City did some of what the Commission advised in those
documents but was not as bound to follow the plans as if the Council had adopted them. Still,
they provide valuable insight into the time period and the fact that they were not adopted is
interesting in it of itself. It cost the city money to create these plans so it indicates significant
divisions in City Hall if the Commission put in time to create a general plan for Hartford that the
Council refused to champion as its own.
I will supplement the general plans of development with the Community Renewal
Program, produced by the same Commission, and the city’s Consolidated Plan for 2000-2005,
produced by various members of the city’s planning department. The reason for using these
plans is that they also provide a city-wide overview of the economic conditions of the time and
the future goals at least some experts within city hall hoped to achieve. While most are advisory
documents, they are the closest to a general overview of development in the city available. They
therefore allow me to see what the city’s priorities were in terms of protecting residents from
displacement, attracting higher income families and individuals to live in Hartford and whether
this changed at all over time. Most importantly, they provide insight into how the city handled
suburban competition, rehabilitation of residential areas and major economic recessions.
Since gentrification first emerges in scholarly literature in the late 1960’s and 1970’s, the
timeframe I will be examining is from 1955 to 2011. I thought it would be wise to look at
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Hartford’s development priorities immediately before gentrification became a household word.
2011 is when the most recent Plan of Development was produced and was intended to guide the
city until 2020. Thus, it is the closest to the present time I could reach using the plans. The
1950’s and 60’s represent a sort of baseline, during which Hartford was little different from other
cities like New York and Boston in struggling economically. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, Hartford
would continue to share significant similarities with other nearby cities that have gentrified, such
as a building boom in the 1980’s. In fact, Hartford is practically a model of second wave
gentrification, which took place from the mid-1970’s to the late 1980’s.153 During this time in
Hartford there is clear evidence of the two most notable aspects of gentrification’s second-wave,
intense political struggles over development and corporate revitalization efforts.154
It is from 1990’s onwards that Hartford’s economic trajectory truly diverges from those
of cities that have experienced gentrification. While the circumstances of the early 90’s that
began the third wave were also present in Hartford, the desire for third wave gentrification has
been more prevalent than its actual occurrence. During the changes to Hartford’s economy that
occurred over the decades I will examine the shifts in economic models and strategies. For
instance, I will determine when urban renewal ceased to be a viable solution and how long it
took for neighborhood rehabilitation efforts to replace it. I will also look for signs of optimism
and how those on the Commission understood Hartford’s potential for growth or lack thereof. I
will be particularly interested in any mention of displacement caused by private development, as
opposed to government interventions such as urban renewal. Likewise, I will focus on efforts by
the city to attract the middle class to live in Hartford as a possible solution to its economic woes.
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Unfortunately, the Plans of Development cannot provide a full sense of the political
dynamics at the time, which are sure to be relevant for gentrification’s potential. Therefore, I
have supplemented a review of the Plans with archived articles from the Hartford Courant from
as early as 1907, when the Commission was founded, to the current year. In order to find the
articles, I utilized the Courant website’s search tool to find archived articles. A major source of
material was looking up the names of Hartford’s mayors during the time period under review. I
was particularly interested in knowing how they came to power, what issues seem to dominate
their tenure and what their relationship was with the City Council, which held the real power in
Hartford until 2003. I also searched for names and institutions featured prominently in secondary
sources about Hartford, such as Nick Carbone, a Deputy Mayor, John Bailey, a Democratic Party
boss and Greater Hartford Process, an ambitious but failed attempt by Hartford’s corporations to
revitalize the region. Occasionally, articles about one individual or group would lead me to other
noteworthy individuals and groups since they were discussed as powerful players in Hartford
politics. The rise, fall and conflicts between these individuals and groups forms the backdrop for
many of the Plans of Development.
Chapter Outline
Using these methods, I found evidence for the beginnings of gentrification in Hartford in
the 1980’s and a city far more open to the prospect of gentrification in recent decades. In Chapter
1, I establish the background for Hartford’s economic peak and subsequent decline. Using the
1955 Plan of Development and the 1965 Community Renewal Program, I demonstrate that
Hartford had a powerful and quite healthy Downtown economy even while the rest of the city
struggled. Yet, even at this early stage, Hartford was already struggling for its economic survival
against the allure of the suburbs. In a theme that will be constant throughout the decades, the
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early plans explicitly refer to the need for greater regional governing and resource sharing if
Hartford is to thrive. Yet, in the absence of any movement on this front, the city continues to
reluctantly compete with suburbs it knows it cannot beat.
In Chapter 2, the decline of urban renewal becomes apparent, as the federal government
backs away from the program and it is increasingly seen in a negative light. Without the federal
spending, the Commission makes its first mention of Hartford’s troubled financial state and
inability to collect adequate revenue. It would have to turn to new, lower cost methods of
development to survive, such as tax abatements and public-private partnerships. By the 1980’s,
Hartford seems to have overcome the economic slump of the 1960’s and 1970’s as a building
boom in Downtown leads the Commission and city to actually worry about too much
development and how it will impact residential areas. It is at this moment that gentrification
might be occurring, but a closer reading suggests that much of the development under way at the
time was actually commercial in nature and threatened to undermine residential areas instead of
enhancing them. With housing prices soaring at the same time, the potential for wide scale,
private rehabilitation of residential areas became even more remote, except where there was
government support.
In Chapter 3, the bubble fueling the building boom has burst, and Hartford’s economy
has gone into free fall. The savings and loans crisis, and the resultant recession, undermined
Hartford’s core remaining industries to such a degree they have never fully recovered. Since the
1990’s, Hartford has struggled more than ever to deliver basic services, eventually requiring
humiliating state interventions that undermined its autonomy and added to the impression
Hartford cannot solve its own problems. It has also been actively trying to attract industries other
than insurance because its dependability proved misleading and Hartford suffered for relying too
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much on it. Hartford now aims to be a part of the “information economy” and hopes to attract
young professionals and college students to live in the city. Downtown is the center of this new
activity and it is still unclear how successful their endeavors will be. What is clear, however, is
that the recession of the early 1990’s had an even greater impact than scholars indicated it would.
With the last vestige of Hartford’s old economic system in shambles, the city becomes markedly
more comfortable with language that approaches open advocacy for gentrification.
Lastly, I conclude with my findings that all three factors, Hartford’s weak position
relative to the suburbs, the difficulty of rehabilitating its residential properties and major
economic recessions, appear to have impeded gentrification in Hartford where it otherwise might
have occurred. I then recommend, assuming that Hartford’s goal is to develop economically
without gentrification, that Hartford’s leaders pursue the formation of a regional government
with Hartford at its helm. This is followed by a brief discussion of the shortcomings of this thesis
and questions that should be asked in future papers.
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Chapter 1-Beginnning of Decline
Introduction:
Gentrification is an economic phenomenon with a fairly long history, and was recognized
as long ago as 1964.155 Over the decades, it has taken on various forms and occurred with more
or less intensity.156 In some cases, gentrification has even come to an abrupt end.157 In this
chapter, I will briefly describe Hartford’s history from the beginning of the 20th century and then
provide a more in depth look at it from the 1950’s through the 1960’s. This will encompass the
early period of its decline and how city leaders first sought to reverse it. To do so, I will analyze
the Plans of Development created by the Commission on the City Plan in 1955, as well as the
Community Renewal Program created in 1965, to provide a glimpse into the economic theories
guiding development at the time and examine how effective the city was at implementing the
plans. The 1950s-1960s was an important era in Hartford’s history that saw economic highs and
lows. It is in these decades that negative economic trends so apparent today began to manifest for
the first time and there was no gentrification promising to bring people back to the city. Under
intense pressure, and heavily incentivized by the federal government, the city put its faith in
urban renewal in hopes of stemming the tide of businesses and individuals leaving for the
suburbs.
The Unplanned City:
One trend that stands out in Hartford’s history is unplanned development. It is not unique
among cities in this sense but, because of the city’s extremely small size, the years of unplanned
development had a significant impact on any attempt to plan going forward. Ironically, this
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occurred despite Hartford creating the first permanent planning commission in the country in
1907.158 The Commission on the City Plan even acknowledges that its early plans had limited
usefulness because they only addressed specific projects and never looked at city development
comprehensively.159 Funding and resources for planning were also a consistent issue and the
Commission still did not have its own dedicated staff in 1955.160 Yet, perhaps the greatest
problem for planning in Hartford is that the Commission could only make recommendations.
Even when it did produce comprehensive plans, it was up to the City Council to approve them
and then actually execute them.161
By the time the Commission produced its first comprehensive city plan in 1955, it was
already true that almost all of the land in Hartford was in use. The sole exception to this reality
were the neighborhoods of South and North Meadows, which contained the vast majority of
undeveloped land in Hartford.162 Interestingly, the plan from 1955 also says that neither
redeveloping obsolete areas nor developing new areas will significantly change the fact that most
of Hartford is already fully developed.163 Rather, the plan is mainly focused on the reordering of
land that is already in use but poorly organized. It also seeks to protect productive land uses
through zoning more effectively than previous efforts, which largely failed to change preexisting land uses.164
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Setting the Stage, Hartford’s Decline:
Since economic decline must occur before gentrification is possible,165 it is important to
understand Hartford in the 1950’s and 60’s. The economic forces that would beleaguer Hartford
and all older industrial cities were already well underway in the 1950’s, but the decade
nevertheless represents the peak before the city’s fall. 1960 is an important milestone as the first
census year since the beginning of the 20th century where the city’s population declined overall,
even when immigration is included.166 This time period is also worth studying because
Hartford’s economic situation was not significantly different from cities like New York or
Boston, which have had radically different trajectories from Hartford following this era. Indeed,
the decline of cities at the time was considered virtually irreversible, and gentrification’s later
emergence would challenge and upend widely held theories.167 Thus, these decades represent a
sort of base line, where gentrification is hardly if at all recognized as a real phenomenon, either
in the metropolises like New York City or smaller cities like Hartford.
Beginning with the political situation in Hartford, political machines are said to dominate
in the 50’s and 60’s, as with most urban centers at the time.168 The important features of a
political machine are that party officials, rather than elected representatives, tend to be the real
power brokers and decision makers in government. Party officials might also be elected in their
own right but it is their status as local or state party chairmen rather than their elected office that
is their real source of power. Effective political machines also do everything in their power to
avoid party infighting and will seek to control who the party standard-bearers are from behind
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the scenes. In Hartford specifically, this was done by nominating loyal candidates for office,
helping them get on the ballot, and holding private meetings before public council meetings to
minimize the amount of debate and haggling that occurred in public.169 This was the case not just
in Hartford, but also in Connecticut more broadly, which were both dominated by the unabashed
party boss and chairman of the state Democratic Party, John M. Bailey.170 As party chairman
from 1946 to his death in 1975, he would be Connecticut’s last true party boss.
While machine politics remained constant during these decades, Hartford nevertheless
went through some significant changes to its political system shortly before and during this time.
In 1947, the city adopted a non-partisan council-manager form of government.171 It should be
noted that this was not really the beginning of weak mayoral power in Hartford, as the previous
system had been a weak mayor-commission system, which is more or less the same as councilmanager except that it was not non-partisan and commissioners were both local legislators and
administrators of major departments.172 While the change was presented as a good-government
reform, there are some who argue it was really an effort by the fading Republican Party machine
to prevent Democratic control of the influential capital city.173
If this were indeed a political ploy by Republicans, it backfired immensely in the short
term. The “non-partisan” system ironically resulted in a council that was more completely
dominated by Democrats than what had existed before or since. Three seats are reserved for a
minority party on Hartford’s city council, but this becomes moot in an officially non-partisan
system. While not officially members of the Democratic party, John Bailey could get an entire
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council of Democratic loyalists by supporting “unaffiliated” candidates of his choosing.174 The
“non-partisan” nature of the Council was widely understood to be a formality that lacked
substance. For instance, when Ann Uccello became mayor, the Council was still officially nonpartisan. Yet, she is clearly identified with the Republican Party and was considered a
Republican mayor.175
Ann Uccello’s victory in 1967 was a major blow to the Democratic Party machine. She
managed to win in a city where Democratic voters outnumbered Republicans three to one thanks
to the political system in place at the time.176 Between 1947 and 1969, the mayor of Hartford was
simply the Councilmember that received the most votes overall.177 Therefore, one did not have to
directly vote against a Democrat to get a Republican mayor. In fact, every Councilmember was
technically in the running for mayor, whether they wanted it or not, because any of them could
receive more votes than their colleagues.178 Uccello’s victory may well have prompted the
Democrats to make a deal with Republicans over charter revisions that brought back partisan
elections in 1969.179 Notably, the Democratic aspect of the deal was that the office of mayor
would become a separate office, elected separately from and without a vote on the Council.180
Considering that the mayor at the time was a Republican, this seems intentionally designed to
weaken the mayor’s influence and ensure that the Democratic Party is in control of Hartford’s
major offices. In return, Republicans would be practically guaranteed three seats on the Council,
since they were the only noteworthy minority party at the time. While this often left them
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virtually powerless in times of Democratic cohesion, they could become important power
brokers when the Democrats became divided, as will become evident later in Hartford’s history.
Uccello had benefitted from Democratic infighting herself, and as the Democratic machine’s
sway over voters became ever more tenuous, Republicans would become increasingly
influential.
Naturally, the Commission on the City Plan would not have been unaffected by these
larger political upheavals and shifts. Indeed, its very composition would need to change with the
charter reform of 1947. For instance, the original composition included members of the board of
aldermen, which no longer existed after 1947.181 Likewise, the responsibility for appointing
Commissioners seems to have changed over time and possibly even been a shared authority. In
the original 1907 composition, the mayor was the presiding officer of the Commission and
appointed two of its members who did not have any other public office. The rest of the
Commission would be comprised of appointed city officials, such as the City Engineer, and
elected officials, such as a Councilmember, to be appointed to the Commission by the other
Councilmembers.182 The composition presented in the 1950’s and 60’s is substantially different
from this. Instead of the mayor as presiding officer, a director-secretary was the head of the
Commission and was elected by Commission members.183 The Commission members, in turn,
were appointed by the city manager, the executive office created by the 1947 reforms. The
manager was not a strong executive and could be fired at any time if enough Councilmembers
wanted to do so. Therefore, the city manager likely served as the indirect link between the
Council’s politics and the composition of the Commission. Interestingly, attorneys have a
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significant presence on the Commission at this time, reflecting perhaps the legal difficulties of
planning in a city full of entrenched interests. Architects, planners and businessmen make up
most of the remainder. Being a member of the Commission likely was not the top patronage job
in Hartford and so its members were probably low-level party loyalists who had some relevant
experience in any of the broad issues the Commission would face in planning.
The 1955 Plan
The first comprehensive plan created by the Commission on the City Plan emerged in the
context of a city where politics and public offices were heavily controlled and regulated by
officials from the Democratic Party. According to the plan itself, it needed to be created because
unplanned development was starting to have potentially dangerous impacts on a city newly in
competition with suburbs over the location of businesses.184 As a city that was fully developed
before the age of the automobile, Hartford had significant disadvantages relative to the suburbs
and could not rely on haphazard development to create the necessary transportation infrastructure
in a timely manner. Interestingly, the outflow of people seems to be less of a problem as the plan
also says that Hartford had been more fortunate than most American central cities in holding its
population.185 Nevertheless, preserving the condition of valuable parts of the city, while clearing
or redeveloping the poorer parts, receives significant attention.186
In terms of its economics, Hartford was a somewhat unique industrial city in that it
already had a substantial non-industrial economy in the 1950’s thanks to its early concentration
of major insurance companies.187 These corporations, Aetna chief among them, would be

184

Hartford Plans for Tomorrow. 7
Ibid. 8
186
Ibid. 7
187
Chen, Xiangming, and John Shemo. “Shifting Fortunes: Hartford’s Global and Regional Economic
Dimensions” In Confronting Urban Legacy: Rediscovering Hartford and New England’s Forgotten
Cities. 193-218
185

47

significantly involved in Hartford politics in later decades, but more or less stayed out of public
policy decisions at this time.188 The plan from 1955 is largely quiet regarding these major
corporations except to say the city economy depends almost exclusively on them and the
manufacturing industry, and that the city’s economic future depends on retaining major
businesses and attracting similar businesses to the city.189
There are multiple possible explanations for the relative lack of discussion regarding the
major insurance and financial industries in Hartford. One potential reason is that the plan was
largely meant to address the city’s issues and the insurance and financial sectors presented few
problems to the city beyond the threat of their relocation. Another, more cynical, explanation
could be that the influence of major businesses deterred the Commission from making any
negative comments about their practices. It is also notable, from the perspective of gentrification,
that the plan does not similarly call for attracting people to relocate in the city. This would be
consistent with its assertion that Hartford had managed to hold onto its population fairly well,
while at the same time saying that major businesses and industry had a tendency to locate in
other parts of the Metropolitan Area.190 Evidently, business moved to the suburbs faster than
people did.
The only business practices the plan really takes issue with are those that occur in the
neighborhoods and outside of the central business district, where the major banks, department
stores and insurance companies were located.191 The plan takes issue with the “ribbon-like”
development along major streets in neighborhoods and advocates that they be made into more
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definite business centers, primarily to reduce traffic and congestion issues.192 It is also opposed
to sub-central business development more broadly because the encroaching non-residential uses
apparently made residential uses less secure, discouraging new residential development and
eventually resulting in poorly maintained housing and abandonment.193 Interestingly, the
encroachment of non-residential uses into residential areas would reappear as a major issue in the
1980’s,194 indicating that this could be an unavoidable side-effect of economic growth in
Hartford, where so little land is available for development.
It is also apparent from the 1955 plan of development that Hartford still had a
significant, if diminishing, manufacturing base and industry was still considered a critical
component of its economy.195 North and South Meadows therefore receive a significant amount
of attention because they contained the only large, undeveloped plots of land left in the city that
factories from inside and outside the city could relocate to.196 However, the lack of development,
especially in the North Meadows, also created some significant barriers to future projects
because the area did not yet have basic utilities or access to the highway, as I-91 was not yet
constructed.197 It is unclear whether the Commission anticipated that a highway through North
Meadows would have the effect of cutting the city off from the Connecticut River but they more
or less got the highway they asked for, though it did not do much to bring manufacturing to
North Meadows.198

192

Ibid. 7
Ibid. 7
194
Hartford (Conn.). Department of Planning. Hartford Plan of Development, 1985-2000. Hartford, CT:
City of Hartford, Dept. of Planning, 1985. 33
195
Hartford Plans for Tomorrow. 7
196
Ibid. 7
197
Ibid. 7
198
Hartford (Conn.). Commission on the City Plan. Plan of Development for the City of Hartford, City of
Hartforc, CT. Commission, 1996. 36
193

49

Two problems commonly associated with Hartford and declining cities generally are
population decline and inadequate educational systems. However, the 1955 plan indicates that
neither of these issues were manifest at the time. At the very least, they were not recognized by
the Commission as issues. Population decline, in particular, which would be noticeable as soon
as 1960, would seem to be completely unanticipated by the Commission in 1955. Rather, the
Commission writes, “it is highly probable that Hartford’s population will stabilize at about
200,000 within the next 25 or 30 years”.199 To be fair, Hartford’s population had been growing
consistently during the previous 60 years,200 including during the Depression, so their completely
inaccurate estimates may have resulted from looking at historical population trends and failing to
appreciate the changes going on around them.
Unfortunately, when it comes to education much has to be inferred from the plans of
development as, “the General Plan is not normally concerned with…the operation and
administration of facilities.”201 Despite having a section of the plan dedicated to schools, it is
almost solely about upgrading the physical facilities and making sure schools were conveniently
placed relative to the school-age population.202 Nevertheless, it is still apparent that Hartford was
starting to struggle to maintain its schools in the face of a growing school-age population since
several primary and secondary schools needed to be reconstructed or discontinued due to a
combination of their age, lack of space and shifting population centers.203 In addition, the plan
mentions, almost in passing, that about one-quarter of students drop out after reaching the age of
16.204 This is oddly not presented as an issue and is actually only mentioned because a lower
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drop-out rate would increase enrollment beyond what the plan was predicting.205 Perhaps at a
time when manufacturing jobs were readily available finishing high school was not considered as
crucial for employment.
Urban renewal was still in its prime in the 1950’s and this is reflected in the plan,
although it is called urban redevelopment. Urban renewal could be considered a kind of
government sponsored gentrification effort in that it involves buying rundown property,
relocating occupants, razing the buildings and then selling the vacant land to private developers
at fair market value for redevelopment.206 Naturally, there were safeguards to make sure those
displaced were offered decent housing they can afford to rent or own.207 However, based on the
public’s concerns about urban renewal a decade later, it would seem these safeguards were not
entirely adequate.208 It seems as though the Commission itself is also somewhat wary of
endorsing urban renewal and sees it primarily as a weapon of last resort against the worst forms
of blight.209 Indeed, it does not offer any new proposals for urban renewal that the Hartford
Redevelopment Agency was not already looking at. At the time, the project that would become
Constitution Plaza, then referred to as the Front-Market Street Project, was really the only
redevelopment plan well under way.210 The areas identified for possible for future redevelopment
projects are primarily in the Frog Hollow, South Green, Sheldon Charter Oak and Clay Arsenal
Neighborhoods, as well as the area of Downtown known as Downtown North.211
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Figure 3: Map of ongoing and proposed urban redevelopment sites in 1955
Constitution Plaza was Hartford’s first urban renewal project and possibly the most
controversial. Downtown had 7,000 residents in 1950 but lost nearly 4,500 by 1960, thanks in
part to slum clearance and the removal of the residential neighborhood in Downtown.212 Hartford
had to relocate 1,800 families because of urban renewal before 1965 and it can be assumed the
bulk of this was from Constitution Plaza, which was by far the largest and most ambitious
project.213 Significantly, minorities had a much harder time relocating due to resistance by white
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communities and ended up either relocating to North Hartford or public housing projects in
South Hartford.214
The Commission provides two noteworthy reasons, beyond Downtown being a slum, for
why renewal was necessary. First, the city needed to revamp its central shopping district in order
to compete with the parking and infrastructure provided by shopping centers emerging in the
suburbs.215 Therefore, as far back as 70 years ago, the constraints put on Hartford by suburban
competition were at the forefront of its development concerns. The third reason for “renewing”
Downtown was in anticipation for construction of a federal highway (I-91) along the riverfront,
which the current neighborhood street system could not support.216 I-91 would still be unfinished
in Hartford as of 1963.217 Work on the Hartford highway that divided Hartford in half, I-84, was
similarly in the building stage by 1965. Thus, Hartford’s development priorities have never been
entirely its own and it has had to balance competing with the suburbs and developing around
federal, and state, projects while paying attention to its own internal needs.
Lastly, the plan discusses the possibility for greater regional cooperation between
Hartford and its suburbs. It is fairly significant that, even at a time when Hartford had substantial
economic strength and a middle class that was not entirely depleted, greater regionalism was
considered important.218 It is also significant that, in providing an example of regionalism that
already existed, the plan cites the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), which mainly
handles the sewage and water systems for Hartford and six surrounding towns.219 Connecticut
did not abolish county governments until 1960, so the fact that the MDC was mentioned as a
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basis for regionalism, and not the county government, suggests that the abolition of counties was
not as significant as supporters of regionalism make it out to be.220 It is quite likely that
Connecticut’s counties had very few powers or responsibilities as this is usually the case in New
England states where counties do exist.221 Connecticut’s parochialism is therefore much more
deeply ingrained and much less unique than it may appear.
The 1960’s: End of the bosses, beginning of decline
The political situation in Hartford was more or less the same for most of the 60’s, but this
started to change towards the end of the decade. The most important structural change occurred
in 1967 with the reintroduction of partisan elections in Hartford and creating a separate office for
the mayor that was elected independently of the council every two years but had no vote on the
council.222 Previously, the mayor was usually the councilmember who got the most votes.223 It is
important to appreciate how dysfunctional and nonsensical this innovation was. In a councilmanager government, the city manager is the chief executive. However, they are not executives
like the president, with separate powers and authorities, but like a company CEO, who can be
hired and fired by a board of directors, or in this case, the city council.224 I never came across a
Hartford city manager who was considered the most powerful individual in Hartford and more
often than not they seem like political tools of the council or the mayor.225 Regardless of the
wisdom of having such a weak executive, creating a separate executive office, in the form of an
independent mayor, would seem to confuse and undermine the purpose of having a council-
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manager system. Yet, perhaps the greatest irony is that, for the most part, executive authority
was practiced by neither the mayors nor the city managers. Oddly, real executive authority was
mostly exercised by deputy mayors in Hartford.226 Hartford essentially had no executive office
with substantial power or independence, so controlling five votes on the City Council was more
important than any job title. The leader of the Council majority typically held this title to
formalize the power they held regardless. Assuming they could keep enough Councilmembers in
line, these deputy mayors had the real power to hire and fire city managers as well as department
heads.
The other important development in Hartford was demographic change and population
decline. While non-whites were only 4% of the population in 1940, they had become 15% by
1960.227 More importantly, minorities constituted 22% of the under 20 population, meaning that
the minority population looked set to grow even more in the future.228 Related to these
population changes, and Hartford’s increasingly obvious decline, riots broke out, mainly in the
northern part of Hartford where minorities were concentrated.229 Once again, Hartford was still
far from alone in the problems it faced and it would seem Hartford’s riots were comparatively
small.230 However, the riots would heighten the perception of Hartford as a declining, unsafe
city. Despite the growing minority population and shrinking white population, it would still be
some time before people of color really took the reins of leadership in Hartford.
The Community Renewal Program (CRP)
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The beginning of all the negative trends associated with Hartford today can be seen in the
1965 Community Renewal Program (CRP), which highlighted a declining educated population,
greater unemployment, reductions in income relative to the suburbs, and a shrinking white
population.231 The CRP was produced before Hartford experienced any riots and before it
adopted a partisan council system. The circumstances surrounding its creation were probably
very similar to those in the 1950’s, but with the impact of ten years of noticeable decline. This
decline is evident throughout the CRP, despite its fairly optimistic outlook overall. Interestingly,
despite experiencing significant population loss between 1950 and 1960 the city still seems to
predict population increase, albeit at the very slow pace of two or three thousand more people by
1980.232 Economically, the CRP found that virtually all economic indicators, such as
manufacturing employment, population, retail sales and personal services, were on the decline.233
The only economic activities that did not trend downward were banking, savings and loans
associations, downtown department stores and insurance operations.234 This is something of a
mixed-blessing since Hartford’s remaining industries of strength were in fields increasingly out
of reach of its growing low-skilled and uneducated population. These activities were almost
entirely located downtown and reflect the CRP’s finding that much of the downtown had been
revitalized by urban renewal and that revitalizing the inner residential neighborhoods was the
next step.235
The Commission asked for more resources and staff in the 1955 plan236 and based on the
Community Renewal Program it would appear their requests were answered. The CRP is much
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more expansive than the 1955 plan and is several times its length. The Commission also finally
had its own staff and even hired professional consultants to produce the CRP.237 It may seem
trivial but official endorsement of the CRP by the City Council is actually significant as it was
not always granted.238 It seems as though plans that lacked official approval would be used when
convenient and ignored otherwise since the City Council never made any commitment to carry
out the plans.239 The city may have adopted an incredibly ambitious CRP in 1965 because there
was significant federal support for urban renewal at the time and a comprehensive plan endorsed
by the city council was necessary to receive the funds.240 The less ambitious plans of
development made shortly before and after 1965 might not have been adopted because there
were no federal grants contingent on their adoption.
Regardless of the city’s motivations, the CRP is perhaps the most ambitious plan ever
produced by the Commission and is reflective of the Great Society era in which it was created.
The federal funding was so generous during this period it even payed the majority of the cost of
producing the plan.241 Inspired by this largesse, the plan calls for the total renewal of Hartford
and the removal of all blight from the city over a 15-20-year period.242 Moreover, its plans
require the displacement and relocation of 7,005 families and 1,156 businesses over the same
time period.243 Based on the CRP’s description of earlier relocation efforts, the most the city ever
had to do at one time was 1,500 families.244 Despite the massive displacement and relocation
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called for, the creators of the CRP took pains to emphasize that the renewal they were talking
about was not a “bull-dozer type operation,”245 like earlier urban renewal projects. They also
explicitly wanted to avoid what happened with relocation after earlier renewal projects, where
minorities were almost uniformly confined to the north end of Hartford, unless they moved to
one of the public housing projects in the south.246 Still, their possibly misplaced confidence that
they had learned enough from the past to have urban renewal without its negative impacts is also
apparent.247
According to the CRP, urban renewal practices had become more “sophisticated” since
the earliest renewal projects and now rehabilitation and conservation were recognized as
valuable tools, in addition to clearance.248 However, spot clearance, the demolition of individual
blighted properties to prevent blight from spreading, is considered a form of conservation so it is
a somewhat misleading label.249 Interestingly, the CRP also says that “the lion’s share of the
rehabilitation…should be undertaken privately. The city’s role should be one of upgrading an
area through conservation, and of helping certain area residents to obtain the necessary financing
to privately rehabilitate their own structures.”250 Therefore, the city is primarily responsible for
clearance of heavily blighted areas and conservation, which includes spot clearance, of less
blighted areas. The areas that are most intensively studied are also those with the worst blight,
which all qualified for federally assisted clearance and redevelopment in part or all of the
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neighborhood.251 It would seem demolition is still a central aspect to urban renewal, their claims
to the contrary.
Some of the reasons the CRP chose not to emphasize rehabilitation are quite telling, such
as “The city does not have any areas that possess the unique environmental charm that has
stimulated upper class rehabilitation in other cities.”252 This fairly harsh assessment came from a
separate study on housing rehabilitation that appears to have been produced by an outside group,
based on the directness of its negativity.253 It basically says that Hartford lacks the “charm”
necessary to attract gentrification. The CRP seems to accept this assessment and elsewhere says
“it is somewhat moot to conclude that the middle and upper income groups…will return to
Hartford in any large numbers.”254 Still, another reason given is that “rehabilitation and the
resultant rent increases…compared to the rents required for new co-op housing does not make
rehabilitation very appealing.”255 Thus, it would seem that rehabilitation was not only difficult
but that the consequences of it would not serve the purposes of the CRP.256 In addition, the
federal government did not appropriate funds that would have assisted rehabilitation and the
CRP suggests that the rehabilitation policy could change if these funds are appropriated.257 This
indicates that urban development at the time was substantially tied to federal initiatives that
heavily favored demolition over rehabilitation. In this pre-gentrification era, it probably seemed
highly unlikely that a market for historic housing would form and attract those with higher
incomes. In the process, Hartford may have inadvertently sabotaged its own potential for
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gentrification by destroying much of its older housing. Eventually, cities would also have to alter
their approach to development significantly when federal funds in general began to dry up.
Ironically, they would realize the potential for private rehabilitation only after engaging in largescale, public clearance.
Some statements make it difficult to really pinpoint the CRP’s opinion of the possibility
or desirability of a return to the city by suburbanites. For instance, immediately after it says it is
“moot” to expect the higher income groups to return in large numbers, it says the city needs to
provide attractive new neighborhoods in part to encourage some of the same higher income
groups to move back to the city.258 The only way I can see these statements as not contradictory
is to place significance on the difference between “large numbers” and “some”. The desirability
of attracting higher income families actually appears throughout the CRP as a major goal. 259 Yet
it is also invariably preceded by the goal of retaining the higher income residents who are still in
the city.260 Perhaps this is another subtle qualification that explains why the CRP seems to
simultaneously want gentrification even as it thinks it is unlikely or has negative consequences.
Instead of a primary strategy, gentrification was more of a secondary objective to retaining the
middle-income population that still lived in the city.
Another sign that the CRP was mostly focused on improving the lives of residents is that
it acknowledges that physical renewal is only part of the revitalization process and that without
social and educational resources, it will not be enough to create renewed communities.261 The
vast majority of these resources are educational in nature, reflecting the extent of the declining
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educated populace.262 Another large category is work training, due to the rising low-skilled,
unemployed population.263 Finally, reflecting the demographic changes toward female-headed
households with young children, day care services, childcare instruction and a distinct category
for services to unwed mothers are included in the CRP.
As for the actual renewal program, the CRP’s map of heavily blighted areas has many
similarities to the 1955 plan’s map of current and possible redevelopment sites.264 However, the
sites are significantly larger than they were in 1955 and a couple of sites are located in the
Northeast neighborhood, which was not under consideration earlier.265 This indicates some level
of continuity, even though the 1955 plan wasn’t officially adopted by the city council. It also
suggests that certain areas of the city were epicenters of blight that began deteriorating earlier
than the others. The Arsenal area in the neighborhood of Clay Arsenal seems to be the most
deteriorated of them all. Aside from the CRP’s evaluation that it is essentially a slum, the area is
over 90% black in a city that is 85% white.266 Such high concentrations of a minority group in a
small segment of the city are indicative of redlining and similar policies that steered minorities
towards certain less desirable neighborhoods.
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Figure 4: Community Renewal Program’s Map of heavily blighted areas in 1965
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Based on Figures 3 and 4, a pattern becomes apparent that the northern section of
Hartford, as well as the immediate environs of Downtown, are identified as the worst sections of
the city. Three neighborhoods are exceptions to this general rule but blight was becoming more
apparent in most of them. Asylum Hill was the only residential neighborhood bordering
Downtown that was not yet heavily blighted. However, it bordered multiple heavily blighted
neighborhoods and signs of deterioration were becoming apparent.267 In north Hartford, Upper
Albany and Blue Hills were northern neighborhoods not considered heavily blighted.268 Upper
Albany bordered more blighted areas but does not appear to be declining as much as Asylum
Hill, though fears of minority in-migration and rising rents were expressed by the community.269
Blue Hills, by contrast, was one of the best neighborhoods in the city at the time with residents
that were more likely to be home-owners than renters and had higher incomes and educational
attainment than the rest of the city.270
The CRP presents Downtown, South Meadows and North Meadows as “special study
areas’ distinct from the major and minor blight categories applied to the other neighborhoods.271
As with the 1955 plan, the Commission was still trying to make both Meadows into industrial
areas, especially North Meadows, but little seems to have occurred in the intervening decade. 272
The city would eventually abandon these efforts after repeated failure and the incursion of nonindustrial uses.273 By contrast, it seems as though past urban renewal accomplished what the
Commission hoped it would in the downtown area, with the exception of causing significant
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depopulation in the Central Business District (CBD).274 Even being at the crossroads of
highways I-84 and I-91, one of which cut Hartford in half while the other cut it off from the
Connecticut river, is presented as a “strategic location” that could “augur well” for the CBD.275
However, pockets of blight remained despite their successes and another grand project
was called for, this time a civic center that would have several entertainment venues from sports
facilities to concert halls.276 As Constitution Plaza was a “commercial center”, the creation of
this new entertainment complex can be seen as complementary to Hartford’s original downtown
renewal project.277 Constitution Plaza was aimed at retaining and attracting businesses to the city
and the civic center was aimed at retaining and attracting individuals. The Commission’s vision
for the surrounding area centers on creating more residential, cultural and institutional uses in the
CBD.278 New retail and commercial activities are only discussed to say they should be developed
to complement the cultural and other uses.279 Based on this vision, it appears that the
Commission thinks the city’s commercial development is in good shape and does not need to be
expanded significantly. In addition, the confusion around the Commission’s apparent desire for
both gentrification and protecting residents becomes somewhat clarified. Downtown Hartford is
clearly treated as its own economy entity, virtually distinct from the other neighborhoods. As the
center of suburban power in Hartford, it receives a great deal of attention and is treated far
differently from other neighborhoods. The deference the city had to wider economic interests in
Downtown is demonstrated by their willingness to turn it into a mostly non-residential
neighborhood just to compete with the suburbs. Thus, Downtown and the neighborhoods seem
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set on two very different tracks and dominated by two very different constituencies and the
Commission tries to cater to both.
Finally, the need for greater regional cooperation is once again apparent in the CRP. The
issue might be getting even more important because it says that many of Hartford’s problems are
regional in scope and difficult to solve strictly at the local level.280 As with the 1955 plan, the
CRP sees positive steps being made toward the realization that Hartford’s revitalization is
important for the suburbs as well as the city.281 Of course, aside from noncommittal regional
meetings and other efforts that do not actually create concrete results, there really is not much
progress being made.282 The need for greater regionalism will be a constant throughout the plans,
as it still has not been realized to a significant degree. Yet, at the same time, regional governance
comes with risks that even Hartford, the supposed would-be beneficiary of a more centralized
system, might come to regret its creation. As the federal highways and demolition incentives
make clear, even when autonomy is traded for something highly valued, the consequences of
sacrificing agency for short-term goals can be far reaching. The 1970’s would provide further
proof that not all regionalist institutions provide solutions to regional problems.
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Chapter 2-Hartford During the Early Years of Gentrification
The 1970’s – Carbone and the Bishops
The 1970’s was a time of transition and change in both the U.S. and Hartford. Between
1970 and 1980, Hartford’s population would shrink by roughly 13% from 158,017 to 136,392,
losing an astounding 20,000 people.283,284,285 This still holds the record for greatest population
decline over a decade in Hartford’s history. Those who left Hartford were, predictably, white
people. Hartford was around 64% non-Hispanic white in 1970 and by 1980 it was a majorityminority city with non-Hispanic whites reduced to 45% of the population.286 While the African
American population did increase as a percentage of the total, it was the relatively rapid growth
of the Hispanic population that really created the dramatic demographic shift.287 Hartford’s racial
politics would now be split three ways instead of two, with African Americans, whites and
Puerto Rican Hispanics forming uneasy racial coalitions in order to be palatable to the whole
city.288 These growing racial divides exacerbated the decline of the old Democratic machine,
which had been built by ethnic whites.
While John Bailey would not die until 1975, the machine he had dominated for so long
started losing its grip on politics, especially in Hartford. As previously mentioned, Ann Uccello’s
victory in 1967 would be the first major sign of the faltering Democratic Party machine. Thomas
Meskill, also a Republican, would then become governor in 1971, but not before the Democratic
primary was won by a candidate not aligned with Bailey.289 Later, the most powerful man in
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Hartford for most of the 70’s, Nicholas Carbone, would be a Democrat that did not owe his
position of power to Bailey.290 Things spiraled out of control even further after his death, when
the Democratic lieutenant governor ran against the incumbent Democratic governor.291
Carbone emerged in the 70’s as a figure of city and state-wide significance.292 He had been
involved in Hartford politics since the late 1960’s but the “Carbone era” really begins in the
1970’s.293 In a city government consciously designed to limit executive power, Carbone realized
that anyone who had five reliable votes on the City Council was essentially in charge. 294 He
would become a polarizing figure in Hartford, variously called a “radical,” “progressive” and
“populist.”295 The extent of his influence also caused him to be likened to a party boss, both by
contemporaries and in hindsight.296 However, this is somewhat inaccurate as Carbone was more
than willing to fuel infighting in the Democratic Party to get what he wanted, which no good
political boss would do.297 Moreover, Carbone’s indirect and seemingly subversive method of
governing was practically required by Hartford’s political system. He could not be the mayor or
the city manager, the ostensible executives in Hartford, without forfeiting all of his power, as the
mayor had no vote and the city manager could be fired at any time by the City Council.298 The
offices he did manage to hold, deputy mayor and later Democratic town chairman, were really
the only ones available that could give his power some legitimacy without limiting it at the same

Driscoll, Thedoroe. “Council Makes It Official; Carbone Voted Majority Leader.” June 30, 1971
Broder, David. “In John Bailey’s Wake: A Party at Its Own Throat.” Hartford Courant. September 6,
1978.
292
Ibid. N.p.
293
McKee. 34
294
Ibid. 34
295
Clavel, Pierre. "What the Progressive City Was." In Activists in City Hall, 16-34. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2010. And McKee. “Mike Peters and the Legacy of Leadership in Hartford,
Connecticut." 34
296
Zaiman, Jack. “Party Scattered into Rival Cliques.” Hartford Courant. July 23, 1978.
297
Broder. N.p.
298
McKee. 29
290
291

67

time.299 Indeed, he would not be the last person to rise to power only to be vilified for trying to
bring some semblance of executive decision making to Hartford’s political structure.300
Carbone had many enemies but two of them, Mayor George Athanson and Councilman
Robert Ludgin, would bring about his stunning fall from power in 1979. Athanson was mayor of
Hartford for a whole decade, from 1971 to 1981, and was well suited to the formally
inconsequential and ceremonial position.301 Ludgin only joined the City Council in 1977, but as a
staunch conservative was one of Carbone’s most vociferous enemies.302 Although, in a sense,
Carbone brought about his own political end by attempting to seize even greater power at a time
when he was already seen as having too much control. Carbone decided to run for mayor against
Athanson while simultaneously creating a charter revision commission to create a strong mayor
system in Hartford.303 In the end, the charter revision never happened, Carbone and almost every
council member who backed him lost and Athanson continued as mayor for another two years
with Robert Ludgin replacing Carbone as deputy mayor.304 Grand ambitions followed by
ignominious defeat will be a surprisingly recurrent theme in Hartford’s political history. Often,
just when a politician emerges that is able to be both popular with the people and influential with
the Council, single incidents or policy positions undo them.
As later plans of development will attest, Hartford was a “company town” for much of
its history up to the 1990’s.305 The major corporations headquartered in Hartford had a strong
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history of providing local leadership and being genuinely concerned with local affairs, for better
or worse.306 The CEO’s of these major corporations were the so-called Bishops, a name that
would seem to be derogatory and indicate their influence was not entirely appreciated. The
Bishops had been growing increasingly involved in development as Hartford declined and were
major proponents of the urban renewal projects in the 1950’s and 60’s.307 Perhaps emboldened
by continuing decline in the 1970’s, the Bishops changed their strategy from simply supporting
government renewal efforts to forming their own development agency, the Greater Hartford
Process.308
The Process was not a complete failure; its greatest accomplishment was the Hartford
Civic Center, which admittedly had its roof collapse in 1978.309 A few other modest projects
were also completed such as rehabilitating apartments and upgrading equipment in Hartford’s
public schools.310 However, these represent a significant failure compared to their initial, naïve,
ambitions for Hartford and the surrounding region. It almost appears as though Process’
leadership considered themselves the regional entity Hartford had been waiting for and wanted to
make a more equitable distribution of people throughout the region. The Process called for
creating a series of “new towns” in the suburbs, particularly Coventry, that would combat urban
sprawl and be a sort of model urban development.311 Nowhere in the literature is there another
example of a corporation or group of corporations trying to revitalize a central city by focusing
most of its resources on suburban development. It is completely counter-intuitive to do so but

306

Ibid. 37
Community Renewal Progam I-22
308
Walsh. 37
309
“Roof Collapse Hearings to Resume.” Hartford Courant. April 19, 1978
310
McKee. 37
311
Grava, Bill. “Firm, Discarding ‘New Town,’ Ponders its Acres.” Hartford Courant. December 19,
1974
307

69

once again reflects how little independence Hartford has from its surrounding region. Hartford’s
corporate and government leaders were widely in agreement that Hartford’s problems could only
be solved with regional solutions and the Process is reflective of this. However, the regionalist
narrative in the Hartford area often serves to justify the creation of unelected regional agencies
outside of the city’s control because Hartford’s suburbs will vehemently resist any regional
government that puts Hartford in a position of power relative to the suburbs.
Unfortunately, both people in Coventry and people in Hartford were suspicious of the
Process’ motives and thought it was actually a corporate plot to dump poor minorities from the
city in eastern Connecticut and redevelop the land they lived on in Hartford.312 There was a
kernel of truth to this, as Coventry was meant to provide a new mixed-income urban community
outside of Hartford that at least some Hartford residents could afford to move to.313 The profits
acquired from selling the new developments in Coventry would then be used to fund
development in Hartford itself.314 Public sentiment turned against the Process yet again when a
memo leaked from the Process that said Puerto Rican in-migration should be reduced, the
welfare dependent population concentrated in Frog Hollow and Clay Hill and the “ghetto”
moved away from Downtown.315 The timing of its release in 1975 was particularly bad, as the
Civic Center had just recently opened and suburbanites were greeted by 1,000 protesting Puerto
Ricans at one of its first events.316 The Process had also just been forced to abandon its Coventry
project at the end of 1974 due to the combination of a similarly hostile reception in Coventry and
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growing inflation during an economic downturn.317 Thus, the 1970’s were a decade of false starts
in Hartford, with failures so spectacular they tended to drown out the more modest achievements.
The story of the Process is important because it appears that Hartford began the second
wave of gentrification a few years too early, with potentially significant consequences. The mid1970’s recession that finally forced the Process to end is the same recession that supposedly
ended the first wave of gentrification.318 However, Hartford in the years before this recession
checks off many of the boxes that define second wave gentrification, namely, the presence of
significant, successful community resistance to elite development projects and the fact that
Hartford’s corporate community was leading the development, not the city.319 The significance
of the early start is that the recession that created the conditions for the second wave in other
cities arguably prevented any gentrification from occurring in Hartford. Although, the
community resistance from Hartford and Coventry was determined to stop the Process, so the
recession may have just been the straw that broke the Process’ back.
It is somewhat unfortunate that the Plan of Development for the 1970’s was made in
1972 because it is so early in the decade. It would have been interesting to see what the
Commission thought about the Process, for instance, either during the height of its ambitions or
after its disbandment. At least at first, the Process was one of Hartford’s most ambitious and
promising revitalization attempts and yet one would not know it ever occurred from the Plans of
Development. It is not mentioned in any of the plans after 1972 either. It is possible the
Commission simply felt the almost exclusively privately funded and organized endeavor was not
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under their purview, although they show a willingness to touch on many subjects they have no
direct authority over.
The 1972 Plan of Development
What is immediately striking about the 1972 plan of development is how much more
negative it is than the CRP. The CRP acknowledges that Downtown had been revitalized earlier,
and that the residential neighborhoods had not, but this is presented as a “next step” that the CRP
was designed to address.320 By contrast, the 1972 plan presents the situation in a tale of two cities
fashion as a “city of contrasts, in part regenerated, in part neglected.”321 It is tempting to see this
as an indication that the CRP was not effective or carried out for some reason, but the first phase
of the CRP’s renewal and relocation program was not set to end until 1975 at the earliest. 322 It is
unlikely that new leadership affected the plan’s outlook, as the Commission’s chairman and its
staff director were both involved in creating the CRP.323 It seems instead that the Commission is
frustrated with the City Council’s failure to adopt the 1955 plan as the official development
policy of the city and its use of the Capital Improvement Program on an ad hoc and underfunded
basis.324 The Capital Improvement Program was the city’s mechanism for funding, scheduling
and coordinating almost all of the projects related to the Plans of Development.325 Evidently,
miscellaneous items would be tacked onto the Program with little regard for how it might affect
the completion of the city’s goals. Thus, Hartford certainly had its fair share of poor
management, short-sighted decision making and wasteful practices that went unaddressed for
long periods of time.
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Constitution Plaza, the symbol of urban renewal Hartford, also gets a very different
assessment. The CRP presents Constitution Plaza as basically an unmitigated success, while the
1972 plan describes its results as mixed at best.326 Within the plaza itself was a pedestrian
“haven,” but it failed to attract shoppers because it was an island surrounded by heavy traffic.327
Going forward, they would need to develop a pedestrian system to link the “people generators”
in the city.328 In addition, no new major retail space had been developed since Constitution Plaza
opened and the city’s retail sector was starting to struggle against suburban competitors.329 This
is the first criticism of urban renewal projects that goes beyond displacement and challenges
instead whether such projects really created much economic benefit.
The Commission also comes across as exasperated, as it begins by saying “very few of
the proposals contained in this plan are brand new.”330 This suggests the city is slow to act on
initiatives even when city agencies and private groups provide them with viable options. These
likely include the recommendations from the 1955 General Plan since, despite not being
officially adopted, the plan talks about the “direction in which the City was being guided by the
1955 General Plan.”331 Ostensibly, this means the City Council used the 1955 plan the same way
it used the Capital Improvement Program, in an ad hoc manner that allowed them to ignore
aspects of it on a whim.
In discussing its goals, the plan comes across as more circumspect or modest about its
potential. It is the only plan to say that any attempt to provide goals for a future Hartford is
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“fraught with controversy.”332 Other plans will acknowledge that it is difficult to make particular
predictions, such as whether rehabilitation makes economic sense or not,333 but the 1972 plan
seems like it is trying not to offend by adding that the status quo is not “all bad or all good.”334 In
another contrast, the 1972 plan says there is no guarantee the goals will be reached within a 10 or
15 year period, while the 1955 plan says it is not “a dream to wait for 5 years, or 10, or possibly
more.”335 Unsupportive local attitudes may have contributed to the plan’s more modest language,
since it also discusses facing strong opposition to rezoning and suggests there was some vacant
land suitable for housing that could not be used because of a lack of “neighborhood
acceptance.”336 It unfortunately does not clarify which communities or neighborhoods were
resistant, though perhaps it was a general opposition and not confined to certain groups or
geographies.
The Commission also admits it can offer no ultimate solutions to the city’s housing,
education and transportation issues as only regional solutions could truly address them and the
Commission can only advise the city.337 They still offer advice, such as pushing for legislative
action to create school districts that cross town and City boundaries.338 They also suggest more
concrete policies the city can take on its own, such as eliminating on-street parking to deal with
congestion, while acknowledging that these improvements will not solve the root problems.339
This reflects a slight but important change between the 1972 and 1955 plans when it comes to
regionalism. In 1955, sound growth and development would be best promoted by regional
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planning, but in 1972 crucial city goals could not be accomplished without regional
cooperation.340 As Hartford’s problems increased, regionalism changed from the optimal scale of
planning to the necessary scale of planning.
The 1972 plan approaches Hartford’s demographic change unlike most of the plans. In
regards to school age population, it is more in keeping with the specificity provided by other
plans. Despite being majority white overall, the school-age population was only one-third white
in 1969-70.341 The plan practically predicts the outcome of Sheff v. O’Neill by saying that “racial
imbalance is built into Hartford’s school system because of the City’s housing and demographic
patterns.”342 Relatedly, the plan found that socio-economic balance in classrooms was similarly
impossible to achieve on a strictly local level.343 However, the 1972 plan does not provide a
detailed demographic breakdown of the population as a whole, which virtually every other plan
does. Aside from the school age population, it does not even provide estimations of the city’s
demographics. Instead it speaks in vague terms about how a “large group” of middle and upper
income residents left the city and were replaced “in part” by southern blacks and Puerto
Ricans.344 It is similarly vague about the size of the dependent population, saying that the young
and elderly “have increased as a percentage” of total population.345 The omission of data backing
up these statements is unique and I cannot think of a reason why they would not provide it. It is
not because the city lacked access to the recent census because the plan cites it as a source for the
data it does present.346
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The diverging fortunes of manufacturing and white-collar industries like insurance and
banking continued in the 1970’s. In addition to shrinking overall, manufacturing was becoming
less diversified, regionally and within the city, and metal fabrication and aircraft/defense
manufacturing were really the only remaining forms of industry by this time.347 The plan
appreciates how problematic this dependence could be, as any cuts in federal defense spending
could cause higher unemployment, which was already stuck at around 10-11% in the city,
compared to the 3-5% average in the Hartford Labor Market Area.348 It is also apparent that the
city was still trying, and largely not succeeding, to attract industry to the North and South
Meadows.349 In addition to these neighborhoods, the Parkville neighborhood is also presented as
an area for potential industrial development.350 Significantly, the plan still refers to Hartford as
an industrial center, if an ailing one at that.351 Therefore, Hartford’s industrial base was still
considered critical even as it became an increasingly white-collar city.
In 1972, over half the workforce was located in Downtown and Asylum Hill in the whitecollar industries, where most growth was occurring.352 It appears these industries were actually
physically growing as well because they were radiating out of Downtown into the “CBD fringe,”
but mainly to its northern fringe.353 The southern fringe of Downtown was still undergoing urban
renewal.354 Asylum Hill is considered unique because it is a transitional neighborhood, i.e. in the
process of becoming blighted, but its land values were actually climbing.355 Interestingly, the
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plan says that the challenge for the CBD is to stimulate development, whereas the challenge for
Asylum Hill is to control it.356 This indicates that Asylum Hill is actually developing faster than
the CBD and that the development has occurred largely without government supervision. If
anything, they seem surprised that Asylum Hill is experiencing so much development.
However, the new development was not without its drawbacks and residential uses in
neighborhoods like Asylum Hill were threatened by it. Commercial and institutional uses
constituted almost a third of Hartford’s land uses by 1972 and their expansion showed no signed
of slowing.357 As a result, Hartford’s role as “the commercial, governmental and institutional
center of the Region” continued, but it could “no longer remain as the metropolitan residential
hub.”358 This reveals a lot about Hartford’s relationship with its suburbs, as its economy is so
dominated by the strictly non-residential needs of the suburban population that residential
neighborhoods are being threatened by uncoordinated growth in commercial and institutional
uses.359 It also necessarily limits the possible areas where gentrification can occur since it is a
largely residential phenomenon.
The 1970’s would be the last decade that saw significant urban renewal, and the plan
reflects this. Even though the large renewal projects proposed by the CRP were ongoing at the
time, their complete execution seems to be in doubt as federal and state funds for renewal were
notably reduced.360 Going forward, funds for the renewal program would need to be “used
sensitively and skillfully” in order to get the maximum benefit from a now scarce resource.361
For the first time, the scarcity of public funds, especially at the local level, is presented as
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prohibitive to carrying out all of the plan’s objectives.362 Importantly, at the same time that
federal funds were diminishing for urban renewal, state legislation was passed that authorized the
City to negotiate a “tax break” with developers for the first years of development.363 Apparently,
this had already been used successfully in Downtown by 1972, possibly meaning the Civic
Center, and the plan encourages its expanded use in redevelopment areas like Asylum Hill. 364
Recent state legislation also authorized the city to negotiate with private property owners so that
their taxes did not increase if they rehabilitated their property.365 This is significant because the
city decided not to emphasize rehabilitation in 1965 in part because there were no state or federal
incentives for it.366 Private rehabilitation and tax incentives for private development are
indicative of a shift from government led urban renewal strategies to privately led, publicly
incentivized gentrification strategies.
Lastly, the 1972 plan discusses a major transportation project, that would not be
constructed ultimately, in fairly dire terms. From the beginning of the age of the automobile
Hartford has faced significant challenges with parking and traffic congestion. Every plan has a
section on parking and transportation but this one warrants a closer look due to the
Commission’s evident frustration with, ironically, the Capitol Region Planning Agency.367 The
irony is that the Commission advocates for regionalism throughout the decades, regardless of the
politics of the time, and yet in this instance a regional agency makes a decision that seems to
infuriate the Commission. The project in question was yet another highway, I-291, that would
form a circumferential route around the city of Hartford, presumably allowing through-traffic to
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avoid I-84 and I-91 during heavy traffic.368 According to the plan, “Hartford will literally be
strangled by automobile traffic if at least major portions of I-291 are not completed.”369 One
reason for the extreme language was that the Capitol Region Planning Agency had already
adopted a policy of delaying I-291 to pursue a mass-transit program.370 This warrants a stark
assessment about the possibility for mass-transit by the Commission, which finds no indication
in Hartford or the country as a whole that the public will switch to mass-transit in large
numbers.371 It is not that the Commission did not support mass-transit – in fact it would prefer if
everyone decided to use it instead of cars – but as a practical matter it made no sense to them to
abandon a viable solution to present traffic problems for an ideal the public would not support.372
However, contrary to the Commission’s dire language the City was not “strangled” by
traffic. Indeed, Hartford was about to witness an economic revival that it has yet to replicate,
though, given how things eventually turned out, that is probably for the best. The growth seemed
so certain that some considered Hartford on the road to a complete recovery of its former
economic position. Unfortunately, Hartford was actually on the road to unprecedented economic
losses. How much Hartford’s growth in the 1980’s was due to the unsustainable financial
practices that eventually cratered the national economy cannot be known for sure. Perhaps the
fact that Hartford seemed to be on the cusp of gentrification should have made people concerned
about the actual sense behind the investments being made.
The 1980’s Boom and Bust:
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The 1980’s witnessed some of the most contentious politics in Hartford’s history as the
city’s mayors finally tried to exert more power, mostly unsuccessfully. First, the anti-Carbone
alliance that helped defeat him in 1979 quickly unraveled. His successor as deputy mayor,
Robert Ludgin, managed to gain an even worse image than Carbone as an “insensitive dictator”
in just two years in office.373 Ludgin decided to run for mayor against Athanson in 1981, though
he had little hope of winning.374 Another candidate not expected to win was Thirman Milner, a
state representative for Hartford.375 Indeed, Milner would technically lose to Athanson in the
initial election, but by a meagre 94 votes.376 He would then take the bold step of accusing the
Democratic Party, which supported Athanson, of engaging in an illegal conspiracy to ensure
Athanson won.377 Evidently, there were enough irregularities to convince a judge to void the
original primary results and call a new election.378 The second time around, Milner defeated
Athanson by a wide margin and became Hartford’s first black mayor.379
Critically, Milner seems to have not understood how powerless the mayor’s office was
on its own. Since the Council was the real source of power, mayors tended to run with slates of
Council members who supported them. For instance, Athanson ran as the party favored
candidate with a slate of Council candidates also endorsed by the party.380 Milner, however, ran
for mayor by himself and the entire slate of party-endorsed candidates for Council won, a pattern
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that continued in his subsequent two elections.381,382,383 Thus, Milner would have a combative
relationship with the Council for his entire time in office as he felt boxed out of important
decision making.384 He would have an even worse relationship with Democratic Party leadership,
namely town chairman James Crowley, whom he essentially accused of rigging the Democratic
mayoral primary.385 Finally, possibly frustrated with the limits of the office, Milner decided not
to run for re-election in 1987, but endorsed Carrie Saxon-Perry, black woman and state
representative for Hartford, as the next mayor even though she was not running at the time.386
Her time as mayor would be relatively uneventful until the 1990’s.
Beginning in the late 1970’s, but really taking off in the mid 1980’s, the city experienced
a stunning recovery that caused city officials and scholars alike to describe, at least parts of the
city, as “rejuvenating”387 and “revitalizing”.388,389 The growth was fueled by a boom in
Downtown office development that lowered vacancy so much that Downtown became a tight
and competitive real estate market.390 Within this new economic context, an issue known as
linkage came to dominate Hartford’s politics. Linkage was a fairly broad term that could
describe any set of policies or regulations designed to share the wealth created by downtown
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development with the neighborhoods.391 However, linkage supporters in Hartford were
particularly inspired by existing programs in Boston and San Francisco, which essentially
created an extra tax on office development that would pay into a fund for neighborhood
improvements like affordable housing.392
Milner, Perry and neighborhood organizations supported linkage because they felt the
benefits of downtown development were only felt by suburbanites and downtown developers,
while the negative consequences were borne solely by poor minorities.393 In addition, a new third
party called People for Change supported linkage, as well as generally being to the left of the
mainstream Democratic party.394 From 1987 to 1993, the entirety of Perry’s time as mayor,
People for Change would control at least two of the council seats reserved for a minority party
and all three from 1991-1993.395 Their timing is somewhat coincidental as, even though the party
supported Perry, she was not involved in their formation.396 Although, her defeat in 1993
arguably caused the group not to contest any further elections.397 None of her successors would
be as bold in challenging the Democratic establishment or downtown business interests.
Based on Milner’s strictly populist political style, I would say the plan produced during
his time in office is not really reflective of his views. Instead, the vision of the Democratic Party
establishment, with its long connection to Downtown and business interests, comes across most
strongly. The Plan does not fawn over the growth of businesses by any stretch, it even has
criticism for the way development has occurred in residential areas, but it is devoid of the
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bombastic language and accusations that populists like Milner were wont to use against political
elites.398 The primary difference is the plan’s relative lack of urgency and concern about out-ofcontrol downtown development.

The 1985 Plan
The 1985 plan represents a significant departure from previous plans in many ways. For
one, it was the first plan of development created by the Commission that was officially endorsed
by the City Council.399 A possible explanation for the Council finally deciding to endorse the
Commission’s plan was the rapid and problematic office development that was occurring
downtown. The city actually imposed a six-month downtown construction moratorium in 1983
to give themselves time to develop new zoning rules and better manage the development.400 The
unusual magnitude of new development may have finally driven home how potentially selfdefeating unplanned development could be.
Yet, even more importantly, Hartford in 1985 appears like it might finally be emerging
from the slump of mid-twentieth century urban decline, though weaknesses in the city’s
revitalization are not hard to find. After decades of substantial population loss, Hartford’s
population decline began to slow and would actually grow slightly between 1980 and 1990.401
Still, after losing over 20,000 people between 1970 and 1980, Hartford’s population was greatly
diminished from its 1955 high.402 Hartford was also experiencing job growth and the expansion

Adams, Debra. “Support of North End voters clinched mayor’s win.” Hartford Courant. September
12, 1991.
399
Hartford Plan of Development, 1985-2000. 3
400
Sandbegr, Jon. “Milner Vetoes Key Elements of Downtown Plan.” Hartford Courant. December 7,
1983.
401
Hartford Plan of Development, 1985-2000. 21 and Plan of Development for the City Of Hartford. 19
402
Plan of Development for the City of Hartford. 19
398

83

of major industries like finance and insurance.403 However, many actual residents of Hartford
remained unemployed because they lacked the skills to fill the jobs that were being created.404
The expansion of financial and insurance companies also had the side effect of threatening
residential neighborhood stability.405 In short, the benefits of most growth and development were
skewed towards white-collar, suburban people while Hartford’s residents found themselves
increasingly irrelevant in the city’s economy.
The 1980’s would appear to be the first and only time, outside of the context of urban
renewal, that displacement of low and moderate income households was an issue.406
Displacement is one of the main features of gentrification, making this one of the clearer
indications that gentrification at least started to occur in parts of Hartford.407 At the same time,
gentrification does not necessarily follow displacement and Hartford represents a unique
situation in which one could happen without the other. While the plan discusses neighborhood
stability and displacement, it talks about using land use controls to preserve the residential
character of neighborhoods.408 If the displacement were occurring due to gentrification, the
residential character of neighborhoods would not be threatened. The occupants may change but
the land use remains the same. On the other hand, if displacement is occurring because of the
growth of office buildings and other non-residential uses, the plan’s concern makes sense. The
1972 plan supports this possibility as it more clearly describes the problem of commercial uses
threatening residential areas in Asylum Hill.409 Thus, one reason Hartford has not gentrified
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could be that, when it was experiencing growth in the 80’s, the particular economic forces at
work actually undermined its residential areas by favoring offices at the expense of houses.
Another, somewhat surprising, reason for a lack of real gentrification during this decade
is that Hartford still contained “various stable middle-class neighborhoods.”410 The existence of
these neighborhoods is less surprising than the fact that they are considered stable in a city that
has seen substantial white flight and population decline. The plan divides Hartford into
development, rehabilitation, maintenance and preservation areas. It appears that the parts of the
city referred to as maintenance areas more or less reflect the stable middle class neighborhoods
as they are similarly described as “basically stable.”411 Surprisingly, the map would suggest
around half the city lies in maintenance areas.412 The only parts that are indicated as troubled, or
rehabilitation areas, are the neighborhoods of Northeast, Frog Hollow, Upper Albany, South
Green, Sheldon Charter Oak, Clay Hill and isolated areas where public housing projects are
located.413 Thus, the entire western portion, and most of the south, would still be middle class at
this time.
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Figure 5: 1985 map of Hartford neighborhoods’ differing economic conditions
Figure 5 is reflective of both shifts and continuity in Hartford’s economic development
strategies. The rehabilitation areas are roughly located in the same neighborhoods that were
targeted for renewal by the 1955 and 1965 plans, except they are once again larger and now
public housing complexes create pockets of rehabilitation areas in neighborhoods that are mostly
maintenance areas. This suggests that the problems meant to be addressed by urban renewal
never were and did not succeed at halting the spread of blight. It also foreshadows the later
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demolition of Hartford’s public housing complexes once they became unsalvageable. In addition,
Figure 5 shows that Downtown and the Meadows neighborhoods are still being treated as distinct
or special areas that receive their own designation as development areas. Notably, they are all
largely non-residential areas and so it is likely that it was easier for the city to develop
extensively in them without as much residential push-back as if they had tried to redevelop the
residential neighborhoods extensively.
Whether gentrification occurred or not, the Commission of the 1980’s had a very
different view of rehabilitation than the one in the 1960’s. Whereas the Commission in 1965
decided not to emphasize rehabilitation, the “rehabilitation areas” in the 1985 plan roughly
correspond to the areas of major blight in 1965.414 With the reduction in federal funding that
began in the 1980’s, usually a necessity for urban renewal, Hartford and other cities were forced
to find other means of providing the same services.415 Evidently, this meant addressing the issues
found in the worst-off neighborhoods with rehabilitation strategies. Interestingly, the plan
actually calls for community development corporations (CDCs) to do most of actual
rehabilitation while the city is just supposed to provide better services not directly related to
housing.416 The plan also seems to accept that some displacement will occur, as the goal is to
minimize, rather than avoid or prevent, the displacement of low and moderate income
households.417
The plan reflects an attitude toward development not entirely in line with neighborhood
activists concerned about the impact of downtown development.418 Its stated goal is to use
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economic growth to increase the income of city residents.419 Critically, the plan expresses
support for a linkage program to ensure Hartford residents benefit from the economic growth. 420
Again, linkage is a vague concept and it does not appear that the plan is endorsing a linkage fee
of the kind that existed in Boston or was advocated for by groups like Hartford Areas Rally
Together (HART).421 Instead, it would have the city use its regulatory powers to require that
developers give first preference to Hartford citizens when it comes to jobs and encourage them to
include low and moderate income units in housing developments.422 These are much less
ambitious, and less redistributionist, linkage policies.
The 1985 plan would seem to have some goals that are incompatible with each other or
with their stated objective of benefitting Hartford’s residents. Most notably, their objective to
create sound housing for all persons is to develop a housing supply in which “30% of the total
units will be affordable to low and moderate income residents, 70% will be market rate units, and
30% will be ownership units, some of which will be affordable…”423 Yet, earlier it states that the
majority of Hartford residents do not have enough income to afford market rate rents or
ownership.424 It is difficult to see how creating a housing supply that most Hartford residents
cannot afford is in their best interest or prevents displacement. In fact, it would seem to
guarantee displacement, or at least significant socioeconomic change. Perhaps this was meant to
occur after residents’ incomes were successfully raised by the plan’s other recommendations.
Regardless, the Commission was planning for a future Hartford very different from the city that
existed in 1985.
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Chapter 3-Hartford in the New Economy
The 1990’s Back to Square One:
Two events of national and global significance occurred in the late 80’s and early 90’s
that would wreak havoc on Connecticut’s economy in general and Hartford’s in particular. Real
estate values plunged as the national economy fell into a recession that even halted gentrification
in New York for a time.425 Cities like Hartford that had just been experiencing a development
boom and tight housing market suddenly found themselves with an oversupply of housing and
new office buildings that were either never finished or stood vacant.426 The first signs of
recession began with bankruptcies in the savings and loans industry, created in part by financial
deregulation during the 1980’s, but spread to the financial industry more broadly.427,428,429 The
weakness in the financial sector led to numerous mergers and acquisitions around the county and
Hartford’s once prominent commercial banks were all acquired by larger banks based outside of
Hartford.430 Insurance was not spared either, as major companies like Connecticut General,
Connecticut Mutual and Travelers were absorbed by larger companies.431 Naturally, these
developments contributed to thousands of jobs being shed by companies struggling just to
remain in business.432 Thus, Hartford’s greatest sources of growth and employment since the
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decline of manufacturing were undermined to an unprecedented degree in the course of a few
years.
As if this were not bad enough for Connecticut’s economy, a separate and completely
unrelated event further diminished what manufacturing was left in the state. In 1991, the Soviet
Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. Unfortunately for Connecticut and Hartford, their
manufacturing industry was largely dependent on receiving defense contracts from the federal
government.433 Unsurprisingly, defense spending fell off sharply with the collapse of the United
States’ greatest adversary and made the unemployment situation in Connecticut even worse.434
Therefore, Hartford entered the 1990’s with its most valuable industries virtually in free fall
because of wider politico-economic changes. Even by 1996, Hartford’s economy appears only to
be leveling off, as opposed to growing again.435
Several development projects took place in the later 90’s that would restore some of the
successful image that Hartford lost earlier in the decade. Known as the Learning Corridor and
Adriaen’s Landing, they were comprised of a number of new educational facilities in the area
around Trinity College and new entertainment venues downtown.436 However, none of these
projects came about thanks to city leadership. Instead, Trinity College’s president, the governor
of Connecticut and the CEO’s of Pratt and Whitney and the Phoenix provided the leadership City
Hall evidently could not provide.437 In reference to the last time Hartford’s elite institutions tried
to take the lead in revitalizing the city, this group was dubbed the “new bishops” by some.438 The
fact that an educational institution and the state government were now the primary proponents of
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new development is reflective of Hartford’s changing economy and the loss of many private
institutions that once played similar roles.
Politically, the early 1990’s would be no less tumultuous during Mayor Carrie Saxon
Perry’s final term in office. Perry’s first two terms had many similarities to Milner’s experience,
with the exception of having the infrastructure of the Democratic party behind her when she first
became mayor.439 She was an independent-minded mayor who had a solid base of support in
Hartford’s black north end, but she was still mostly powerless and ignored by the City
Council.440 Unlike Milner, when Perry grew frustrated with her powerlessness she decided to
revolt against the Democratic party establishment by rejecting their endorsement and running
with her own slate of councilors that would be loyal to her.441 Together with the third party
People for Change, Perry’s challenge slate defeated every incumbent and took complete control
of the city council.442 For some of her supporters, including Milner, the upset was a repudiation
of the council’s close alliance with downtown business over the neighborhoods.443
However, the next two years would not be a period of unified, populist council
leadership. Despite the fact that most of the council won solely because of Perry’s “coattails,” it
became clear fairly quickly that Perry did not actually have full control over their votes.444 The
fight between Perry and the council during her last term had almost nothing to do with policy
differences and was instead essentially a power struggle.445 Perry and her council had run on
revising the city charter to give the mayor more power, but Perry wanted a strong mayor system
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in which she was the chief executive while five of the councilors were only willing to give the
mayor a vote on the council.446 Crucially, because her opponents had five votes, they could block
charter revision from going through, and virtually anything else Perry wanted.447 Thus, Perry
actually ended up with yet another hostile council that limited her authority despite her stunning
success in 1991. Unfortunately for Perry’s image, all of this infighting occurred largely in public
view and tarnished her reputation as both a leader and someone capable of bringing Hartford
together.448
The defeat of Mayor Perry and the victory of Mike Peters in 1993 was a unique
occurrence almost without parallel in the time period under consideration. Hartford is an
overwhelmingly Democratic city and usually Democratic primaries are more meaningful than
the general elections. However, 1993 was an exception. Despite the breakdown of her coalition,
Mayor Perry managed to defeat her own deputy mayor and her allies defeated most of the
Democratic councilors who turned against her in the Democratic primary.449 Despite this, she
lost by a wide margin to Mike Peters in the general election, who ran as an independent.450
Peters’ political strength was similar to George Athanson’s, he was not really a leader on any
issues but he was a likeable individual who ran a campaign that was upbeat and optimistic at a
time when Hartford was going through a severe recession.451 Even though he was white, he made
a point of having Hartford’s minority groups represented in positions of power while avoiding
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talking about racial disparities.452 He considered the job of the mayor to be “sell[ing] the city”453
and his reputation as a weak mayor and “cheerleader” are fairly reflective of his approach to
governing.454 He tried to get along with everybody, neighborhood groups, downtown businesses
and suburbanites, in the belief that they would all help Hartford if they were on friendly terms
with the city.455
Peters’ rise would coincide with a unusual moment of political empowerment for
Hartford’s Republicans, who had not held all three seats on the City Council reserved for a
minority party since 1985.456 Republicans defeated all three People for Change candidates in
1993, and with the help of Peters and two Democratic councilors that were cross-endorsed by the
Republican party, the position of council majority leader would go to a Republican in Peters’
first term from 1993 to 1995.457 This unique power sharing agreement ended in Peters’ second
term, when the council’s Democrats reunited and the usual arrangement of Democratic control of
the council returned.458 Still, the Democrats that were elected were moderates or conservatives
on issues like welfare reform, tax cuts and privatization so they had a mostly positive
relationship with the Republican minority.459 One of the most controversial decisions made
under this more conservative atmosphere was the hiring of a private organization, Educational
Alternatives Inc., to manage the entire Hartford public school system.460 Begun by the school
board, and then somewhat reluctantly accepted by the city council in November of 1994, the
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experiment with EAI would last a little over one tumultuous year.461 Shortly after the failure of
EAI, which had as much or more to do with political infighting as it did with EAI’s own
shortcomings, the state stepped in to administer city schools for the rest of the 1990’s and into
the early 2000’s.462
The Commission in 1996 is reflective of both the particularly weak Democratic Party at
the time and the more consistent racial realities of Hartford since the 1970’s. Ensuring that
Hartford’s three racial communities had representation in government was particularly crucial
for Mike Peters, a white man who defeated a polarizing black woman known for challenging
powerful Democratic Party interests.463 The director of the Housing Department at the time was
a black man, the city manager a black woman and the Commissioners themselves a mix of nonHispanic whites, blacks and Hispanics. Furthermore, three of the seven Commissioners, or nine
if alternates are counted, were Republicans. Old fault lines had faded away over the previous
decades and now new ones were forming. Hartford’s entrance into the new, post 1980’s
economy, reflected this sense of upheaval.

The 1996 Plan
The economic context for the 1996 plan is significantly different from all the plans that
came before it. Put briefly, the plan says almost every economic sector considered important or
necessary in previous plans is no longer reliable for future growth. Insurance, finance and aircraft
manufacturing are not just described as diminishing in value, but as sectors that cannot be relied
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on to lead a recovery or provide job growth.464 For a city that was known for its strong insurance
industry, this was probably as much a hit to its identity as it was a hit to its economy. 465 The plan
suggests as much when it states that “Hartford is no longer a ‘company town.’”466 In addition,
the apparent bitterness of the Commission towards these companies for leaving comes across
with surprising clarity for an official city document. Besides describing them as monolithic
corporations, it says “the time when a handful of corporate bishops could meet privately to plan
future development of the City is in the past.”467 This is the only plan to actually use the term
“bishops” to describe Hartford’s corporate leadership and the context makes it clear that it is not
a term of endearment. Their industries had been considered recession proof because they
continued to grow throughout Hartford’s decline but the swiftness with which they cut off their
decades-old relationship with the city was a shock. The withdrawal of these corporations from
local leadership is significant, as they were behind every large-scale development project
Hartford had pursued, from Constitution Plaza to the Civic Center and the downtown office
boom of the 1980’s.
In the midst of this major economic recession, unique demographic shifts were allowed to
occur that would exacerbate Hartford’s population loss and increase the minority population of
Hartford’s suburbs. For a sense of just how bad the real estate market became, many of
Hartford’s minority residents who had long been priced out of the suburbs found themselves able
to purchase homes.468 Another reason this happened was a change in how Section 8 vouchers
could be used.469 Previously, they were place-specific, but this practice was criticized for
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resulting in concentrated poverty since eligible individuals had to live in specific units, often
located in high-poverty areas.470 In 1983, Congress made portable Section 8 vouchers for lowincome families that, while issued locally, could be used to rent anywhere in the United States
that had a Public Housing Authority.471 The Commission seems to have mixed feelings about
these changes. In a way, the recession had made possible the kind of upward mobility the city
wanted for its residents by breaking down the suburban pay wall.472 Yet, this also drained the
city’s population at a critical time and left it with an even poorer population as only those who
could not afford even the greatly diminished suburban housing prices remained.
After discussing the unexpected population shifts, the Commission wonders out loud if,
perhaps, the recession might actually provide a similarly unexpected benefit for the city.
Particularly, the plan tries to predict when economic and social forces would begin to encourage
in-migration into Hartford, as opposed to the significant and ongoing out-migration.473 Without
actually using the term rent-gap, the plan states it is possible that market forces driving down
housing demand and prices in the city could lead to a turnaround when prices are sufficiently
low.474 However, the plan quickly recognizes that quality of life issues like education and crime
get in the way of this strictly market-based “solution” to attracting and maintaining middle and
high income residents.475 Still, the Commission seems like it would be glad to see gentrification
occurring in Hartford.
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The Commission’s recommendations for lead abatement are perhaps the clearest example
just how economically depressed the city was and how far it was willing to go to avoid further
economic damage. Lead was a major problem in Hartford because it had been used in paint until
1978 and the vast majority of homes in Hartford were built before then.476 The cost of abating
lead in Hartford convinced the Commission that total abatement would not be possible and that
the realistic goal would be to minimize lead poisoning among Hartford’s children.477 The
Commission also recommends against a strict policy requiring property owners to abate lead
because doing so would have a negative effect on already low property values and encourage
more abandonment.478 However, this is somewhat odd reasoning given that houses having lead
paint by itself lowers property values, deters home buyers and makes rehabilitation prohibitively
expensive.479 Nevertheless, both the prevalence of lead based paint in Hartford’s built
environment and the city’s inability or unwillingness to address it demonstrate quite well the
simultaneous barriers to growth Hartford faced. On the one hand, it had severe structural
problems that hurt the city’s image and its economy. On the other hand, it was largely helpless to
act, even in its own economic interest, as a real loss of economic power and outside funds
combined with a fear of losing even more to make the Commission extremely cautious.
In the absence of corporate growth and political leadership, Hartford would have to find a
new economic paradigm to rely on. One way the plan hoped to do this was by building on the
successes of neighborhood commercial strips that had shown more resilience than the big
employers downtown.480 Neighborhoods would be especially important for preserving Hartford’s
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retail sector after the closure of Hartford’s last department stores and other major downtown
retailers basically ended the city’s position as a regional retail center.481 This is a fairly ironic
reversal of fortune as most of the previous plans focused on supporting downtown retail while
characterizing the “strip” commercial development occurring outside of downtown as
problematic because of traffic concerns.482 The Park Street area in Frog Hollow is given as an
example of a successful neighborhood retail district, along with Franklin Avenue in South End
and Albany Avenue in Upper Albany.483 Importantly, all three commercial strips are explicitly
identified with particular ethnic groups, Latino, Italian, and African-American and West Indian
respectively.484 This reflects a broader hope to, essentially, capitalize on Hartford’s diverse racial
and ethnic makeup based on the belief that the “richness” of various ethnic and cultural groups
would benefit efforts to develop an arts and entertainment district downtown.485 Commodifying
ethnic identity is a potential strategy for gentrification, one that is more amenable to minorities
who live in the targeted neighborhood because it is technically community focused and
celebratory of ethnic culture even as its primary motivation is economic development and
making the city more attractive to outsiders.486
Much of the economic vision espoused by the 1996 plan fits with this more
palatable form of gentrification. First, the more controversial and plainly neoliberal
sentiments expressed by the plan are presented as necessary adaptations that the city has
little choice but to adopt. The plan states that, in addition to technological changes,
ideological changes are limiting the capacity of urban centers to control their economic
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health, forcing them to redefine their roles in the nation’s economic life.487 It is
interesting that the plan does not specify what those ideological changes are but the
following quote provides a good sense of the new direction the city was “forced” to
follow:
The long term economic recession has changed the city’s land use agenda. Economic Development
has become paramount, as the role of municipal government is shifting from being a regulator which
ensures that development is in the public’s interest to the greatest extent possible, to being an
initiator of economic activity, committing public resources to private enterprise as a means of
generating jobs.

The quote almost perfectly describes the entrepreneurial state.488 In fact, it describes it
with such precision I would not be surprised if the Commissioners were familiar with
Neil Smith’s works. In a neoliberal state, the concerns of the market and private capital
take precedence over the concerns of labor and consumers. Yet it appears that the
Commission is not describing its own view on development. Instead, the quote is
describing the “objective reality” that the Commission is faced with. Contrary to the
implications of the above quote, the 1996 plan, in keeping with every previous plan,
makes a point of saying economic development needs to be balanced against improving
the quality of life of residents.489 However, it is likely that the city’s commitment to this
balance would not be as strongly as it once was since its understanding of its role in the
new economy was radically different from what came before.
Not only did the Commission feel the government’s role had changed, but the economy
of Hartford had as well. The need to adapt to these new realities comes across strongly in the
plan. As previously stated, Hartford lost in a very short amount of time all or most of the
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industries that had defined it for decades. The commissioners worried that the city’s economic
structure continued to narrow, being increasingly dependent on the financial, insurance and real
estate (F.I.R.E.), services and government sectors.490 Overdependence on a few major industries
is one of the reason’s the recession was so bad in Hartford and the Commission was keen on
diversifying Hartford’s portfolio. The Commission especially wanted Hartford to find something
to replace the FIRE industries as its mainstay because it was not predicted to grow and was
clearly not wise to rely on in the future.491 In this context, attracting businesses would be a far
more serious and important tactic for the city because it now lacked the certainty of being able to
fall back on the FIRE industry no matter how bad things got. Attracting business and industry
had always been a part of Hartford’s playbook, but only in this plan of development does it talk
about the need to “aggressively market the city for new business.”492 Given that Hartford would
have to recreate its economic niche in a hyper-competitive world, almost from scratch, it is
understandable why they thought the recruitment effort needed to be intensive.
The Commission offers some indication of where it expected and hoped Hartford’s
economic future would lie. By their reckoning, Hartford had six promising opportunities to
change its economy for the better.493 Two of them I have already touched upon, neighborhood
businesses and “arts, entertainment, culture and tourism,” but the others were the health industry,
a light speed rail project, “deconcentrating” public housing and Hartford’s physical location.494
The last supposed opportunity was quite fanciful because the Commission evidently hoped that
Hartford’s location would give it an advantage in becoming a “destination on the Information
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Superhighway.”495 In other words, they considered Hartford becoming a home to advanced
technology firms and information industries as a possibility worth pursuing.496 They at least
didn’t bother to pretend like Hartford residents who could not get jobs in the insurance industry
would somehow benefit from the growth of advanced technology firms in Hartford. Residents
would instead find employment in the growing health industry, which already employed a higher
percentage of residents than the City of Hartford itself.497 The expansion of Hartford’s health
industry was largely limited to two large hospitals, St. Francis and Hartford Hospital, and the
Commission wanted Hartford to attract even more medical technology and related firms since
they continued to grow while every other sector in Hartford was stagnant or shrinking.498
Lastly, the Griffin Line, a light speed rail line that would have connected downtown
Hartford to Bradley International Airport and Bloomfield, was considered an extremely
important opportunity that should become a reality.499 Unfortunately, like I-291 before it, this
heavily favored transportation project was shut down by an apparently hostile state DOT.500
Thus, with the exception of entertainment, tourism and an aspiration for advanced technology
firms, most of Hartford’s new economic opportunities were actually located outside of
downtown for a change.
I have skipped over deconcentrating public housing because it deserves a less cursory
treatment. That the dispersal of poverty is considered an economic opportunity is indicative of
the Commission’s, and the nation’s, shifting priorities for development. Hartford’s approach to
deconcentration was like many cities in the 1990’s; it demolished some of its oldest and largest
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public housing projects, notably Charter Oak Terrace in the neighborhood of Behind the
Rocks.501 The decision to completely demolish the projects is described as a dramatic policy
reversal by the Hartford Housing Authority, which had been seeking federal funding to
rehabilitate the projects.502 Once again, national economic development priorities had a
substantial effect on local development. The federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development was willing to provide HHA with millions of dollars to raze the projects while it
ignored its requests for rehabilitation funding until the projects were unsalvageable.503 In the
place of this low-income housing project they would build townhouse apartments and single
family houses, not exactly the kinds of homes tenants of the project would be able to afford.504
Indeed, the HHA would have to revise the plan at a later date to have more of the replacements
be rentals because they realized wide-scale homeownership would not be possible.505 However,
the main reason demolishing public housing was considered an economic opportunity was
because it provided the city with plenty of land to develop for commercial purposes, in this case
on prime land next to a major highway and West Hartford.506 This development would actually
be successful, despite labor union opposition, and is now a shopping complex dominated by a
Wal-Mart.507
Clearly, Hartford in the 1990’s was a city in transition and unsure of where exactly the
vast, global economic changes that were occurring would take it. The Commission hoped to be
able to take advantage of the health industry and the information economy but these come across
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as highly aspirational goals. More promising, and proven, would be Hartford’s ability to grow
and regain a positive image through ethnic local markets and downtown entertainment venues.
Of course, as much as the Commission seems to have given up on them, there were still several
large insurance companies in the downtown area and these would continue to be important to
Hartford’s economy.

The 2000’s: Charter reform at last
The most significant change to Hartford’s political system, since 1947 at least, would
occur in the first decade of the new millennium. In this decade, Hartford would join the likes of
Boston, Chicago and New York by adopting a strong-mayor form of government.508 After three
decades of different city politicians trying and failing to bring this about, including as recently as
2000, it seems Hartford’s populace finally warmed to the idea of having a strong mayor.509 The
charter revision won every voting district in Hartford in 2002 and no organized and powerful
opposition emerged against it.510 It greatly enhanced the powers, independence and salary of the
mayor, giving them full authority to hire and fire department heads in the interest of increasing
efficiency and accountability.511 Presumably, there would be less infighting over appointments
and the mayor would from now on have to own all the credit or blame for decisions made by the
city’s departments. It also extended the terms of mayors and council members to four years
instead of two, starting in 2003.512 Charter reform further altered the makeup of the school board
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in the mayor’s favor. Previously, it was made up of seven members and only three were mayoral
appointees. Now, it would have nine members and five would be appointed.513 Lastly, charter
reform would create a new planning and zoning authority, rendering the Commission on the City
Plan defunct and replacing it with the Planning and Zoning Commission that exists today. 514
Hartford’s first strong mayor would also be its first Latino mayor, Eddie Perez, a former
community organizer deeply involved in Trinity College’s Learning Corridor project. 515 Similar
to Carrie Saxon Perry’s final term, Eddie Perez and his council slate ran on a promise to carry
out charter reform and create a strong mayor.516 However, Perez’s first campaign was much less
eventful. After eight years in office, Mike Peters had decided not to run for re-election after
2001, meaning there was no incumbent to run against.517 Despite this, the election was not a
wide-open field and Perez, who had never held elected office before, emerged as essentially the
only viable Democratic candidate early on.518 Indeed, unlike the gregarious Mike Peters, Perez
was a notably poor public speaker who made virtually no specific promises, besides charter
reform, during his first campaign. Even the Hartford Courant, which endorsed him, described
him as “the best on the B-list.”519 Perez’s avoidance of the issues, and his willingness to
substitute his council slate with three Party loyalists, despite arguably having the upper hand,
caused many to underestimate to him.520
However, Perez would quickly surprise those who doubted him by wielding immense
power even before charter reform went through. As many predicted, the three council candidates
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that were tied to the party establishment quickly turned on Perez, in this case over the
appointment of an interim city-manager.521 In something of a repeat of Mike Peters’ coalition
council, though more aggressive, Perez froze out the rebellious council members by forming a
five-vote majority with two loyal Democrats, the council’s two Republicans and its one Green
party member.522 In this coalition, Republicans once again held leadership positions, including
deputy mayor, in an overwhelmingly Democratic town.523 Perez’s surprisingly deft political
maneuver would be characteristic of the kind of leader he was. He was a blunt and unpolished
public speaker who, after winning election, would not shy away from telling hard truths and
flexing his political muscles to control city decision making.524
One thing Perez viewed as problematic was the “abdication of responsibility at city hall
for the major issues facing Hartford.”525 Particularly in the realm of education and economic
development, the city had become increasingly dependent on initiatives managed outside city
hall. For one, there was the Learning Corridor, which was brought to fruition by Trinity College
and Southside Institutions Neighborhood Alliance (SINA), not the city. Then, there was
Adriaen’s Landing, a major downtown development project conceived of and funded by the state
of Connecticut and managed by the Capital City Economic Development Authority, a quasipublic entity.526 Last, but not least, the city invited the state to take over its failing school system
and it would be more than five years before the city would resume control of them.527 It was
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Perez’s aim to provide the strong leadership and accountability that seemed present everywhere
but city hall.
Ironically, Perez’s ignominious end would be brought about by “mistakes” he made
involving certain development projects. First, a city contractor who was being paid millions by
the city for a reconstruction of Park Street remodeled Perez’s home for no pay, which seemed
incredibly suspicious.528 It did not help Perez’s case when the contractor later testified that he did
so with the expectation that Perez would help him remain on the Park Street project, which was
mired in problems.529 Secondly, Perez was connected to an attempt by one of his powerful
supporters to extort $100,000 from a developer trying to buy a valuable parking lot.530
Interestingly, all of this began to emerge as early as 2007, and was even weaponized by his
political opponents, to no success.531 Thus, the investigations surrounding these actions hung
over his entire third term, eventually dominating his time after his arrest in September of 2009.532
He refused to step down unless he was convicted, so Hartford had to face months of having its
mayor divide his time between being mayor and being in court.533 The saga was not good for
Hartford’s public image, and regardless, Perez was convicted in June 2010 and resigned shortly
after. Perez would be succeeded by Council President Pedro Segarra, “the accidental mayor.”534
Given how promising a leader Perez seemed to be, his very public and humiliating downfall
must have been yet another demoralizing shock for Hartford.
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Perez’ rise and fall would show that, like regionalism, strong mayor governance was not
without its drawbacks and was not a panacea to Hartford’s problems. Both reforms are aimed at
centralizing political power and there is always an inherit danger that empowering local
politicians will simply allow them to make errors on a grander scale. Moreover, they implicitly
assume that the problems facing cities like Hartford stem from its governance and not structural
issues that are unaffected by how powerful the mayor is or how equally resources are distributed.
The Consolidated Plan for 2000 is the clearest of all the plans in finding that barriers to
gentrification are literally built into Hartford’s infrastructure and amending the city charter
would do little to change that.

The 2000 Consolidated Plan
The Commission on the City Plan/Planning and Zoning Commission would not produce a
Plan of Development between 1996 and 2011. Fortunately, it is still possible to get a broad sense
of the city’s economic development agenda for 2000-2005 from the Consolidated Plan. This was
produced during Mike Peters’ last term in office, but most of the City Council at the time was
not in office during 1996. Unlike the Plans of Development, which were largely designed for the
city’s own purposes, producing a Consolidated Plan was a requirement for obtaining Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG) and various other grants from the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).535 Thus, it was written by a combination of personnel
from different city departments, though primarily from the Offices of Housing and Community
Development and Grants Management.536 Moreover, its focus is exclusively on low and
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moderate-income people, as the grants HUD provides are targeted towards those populations.537
It is therefore much less concerned with the middle-class population in general, making it less
likely they would discuss gentrification directly. Still, the Consolidated Plan provides some
valuable information regarding Hartford’s self-image, its continuing problems and the way it
advertises itself even as it struggles.
Immediately, the Consolidated Plan makes it evident that some significant changes have
occurred since 1996. Or, at least, that the city is trying to create that impression. Compared to the
slump of the 1990’s, Hartford is described as having “optimism and vitality” as well as a
construction boom that is evident “across the city.”538 Yet, this rosy picture is just as quickly
dashed by the revelation that, “after one of the longest economic expansions in recent history,”
Hartford had actually grown poorer since 1990.539 Frankly, it is hard to see the vitality in a city
where more than seven out of ten residents spend more than 30% of their income on housing
alone.540 Bearing in mind, also, that owning a car is an additional cost most Hartford residents
would need to be able to maintain employment. It would seem that by 2000, Hartford had
returned to its more familiar pattern of simultaneously seeing new development while its
residents became poorer.
One of the most striking problems the city faces is what the plan refers to as an “appraisal
gap” making substantial rehabilitation efforts difficult.541 This is noteworthy as it appears to be
the exact opposite of the rent gap, indicating a situation where “the cost of repairs or demolition
and new construction exceeds the appraised value of new or rehabilitated housing.”542 Lead paint
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abatement, which was still an issue, is mentioned specifically as something creating this gap.543
It is also likely that the some of the findings from the CRP of 1965 were still applicable, given
how old Hartford’s housing was, in which case most of Hartford’s housing would be three
decker rental units.544 As that plan so bluntly put it, “a rehabilitated three decker is still a three
decker (i.e. not highly valued).”545 The city was already making a short term effort to address
this by providing public subsidies to overcome the appraisal gap and allow private development
to occur.546 However, the size of the gaps that the city had to close limited the number of projects
it could assist.
From a strictly economic perspective, this would mean gentrification was physically
impossible for many Hartford properties because the economic incentive to rehabilitate cheap
houses and sell them at a profit was not there. Many have argued that there are cultural and noneconomic reasons people engage in gentrification, but this nevertheless would close the door on
a subset of gentrifiers. The city’s three priorities for housing are all geared, to a greater or lesser
degree, at eliminating this barrier by “expanding home ownership, rehabilitating multi-family
rental housing units and demolition of abandoned residential properties that have outlived their
usefulness.”547 This is a rather interesting change as well because when rehabilitation was found
to be economically unfeasible in 1965, the Commission decided not to emphasize rehabilitation
as a strategy.548 Yet, at this time, rehabilitation comes before demolition and new construction as
a priority.
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Another trend that comes across is the notion that Hartford has done all it can for certain
communities and that it is up to suburbs to provide a real solution to issues like homelessness
and concentrated poverty. The notion that only the region can address certain issues is not new
but Hartford’s willingness to apparently give up on assisting the population until the suburbs do
their fair share is. Even though homelessness is a major topic of the Consolidated Plan, per HUD
requirements, the plan states “Hartford is working to address the needs of the homeless on a
regional basis. No new emergency shelters will be developed in the city.”549 Perhaps, as the plan
suggests, regional cooperation was receiving “more than mere lip service” and the idea that
shelters might be constructed in the suburbs was not so far-fetched.550 However, there is no
clear-cut evidence provided that Hartford’s work to address the needs of the homeless was
having any progress and in the meantime, they presumably had overcrowded shelters that not
every homeless person could utilize. Depending on a regional solution to anything in
Connecticut is a significant leap of faith and their willingness to take it on behalf of the homeless
is noteworthy. Perhaps as a sign of the time period’s new emphasis on “taking responsibility and
accepting consequences”, the city preferred to focus its resources on helping the homeless gain
independence and self-sufficiency.551
Yet, it would appear that Hartford’s resources for housing assistance were already
strained beyond their capacity without adding homeless who would otherwise stay in shelters to
the list. The waiting list for Hartford’s Section 8 program and the waiting list for public housing
were so overwhelmed by requests that the former had been closed since 1996 and the latter since
1999.552 By the plan’s estimates, 60% of Hartford households needed some type of housing
549
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assistance.553 This is a staggering number and one would think more homeless shelters would be
necessary between Hartford’s lack of resources for housing assistance and the number of people
who needed them to remain in their homes.
The public housing situation in the city is an even clearer sign of a shift away from
feeling responsible for certain populations to forcing them to accept responsibility for their
status. The demolition of Charter Oak Terrace, the first public housing project to fall, is
invariably referred to as the “Charter Oak success story.”554 Their success was in turning a
deteriorated public housing project into a shopping complex. Evidently the parallels between
their actions and what the city did during urban renewal were lost on them. Just like with
Constitution Plaza, albeit on a lesser scale, they destroyed a blighted residential area to build a
shopping center in the suburban style. It also notable that city officials thought it was a good idea
to demolish most of Hartford’s public housing at a time of rising homelessness and chronically
inadequate housing assistance.555 It appears that at least some of these demolitions created a
population of involuntarily displaced people who were still on the Section 8 waiting list at the
time of writing.556 While it does not specifically say they were displaced by the demolition of
public housing, it is unclear how else they would have been displaced involuntarily. The
continued demolition of public housing likely prolonged the outmigration of low-income and
minority families from Hartford because the plan states that they were provided Section 8
vouchers and that a sizeable number of residents opted to take their housing assistance to the
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suburbs.557 It is therefore possible that greater economic and racial integration was under way at
this time, at least in the suburbs.
As previously mentioned, the plan suggests regionalism is finally receiving more than lip
service from the state and suburbs. Their claim is not without evidence, as the Capital Region
Growth Council (CRGC), MetroHartford Millennium Project, Adriaen’s Landing and Capital
City Economic Development Authority (CCEDA) all formed or began within the past decade. 558
The plan’s understanding for why the long hostility to regionalism has diminished is interesting.
In essence, they believe the recession of the 1990’s, which heavily impacted all of Connecticut,
finally gave the suburbs a sense of economic insecurity and prompted the realization they could
not succeed on their own.559 Sheff v. O’Neill, which forced suburbanites to realize just how
racially segregated Hartford was, while also giving them a stake in Hartford having at least some
decent schools, is also credited.560 Perhaps most interesting, the plan claims the out-migration of
Hartford residents which began during the recession brought “inner-city challenges” to the inner
ring suburbs, forcing them to contend with issues they had avoided and causing them to
appreciate Hartford’s struggles more.561 If this were truly the case, it could be argued suburbs
started taking more of an interest in Hartford once it became apparent that Hartford’s problems
would eventually become their problems if they did nothing to help. Moreover, if the suburbs
had become more concerned with Hartford’s future then they would likely form a powerful progentrification constituency, certainly at the state level, but possibly even within the city itself.
Already, there seems to be tension over ultimate goals, as one of MetroHartford Millennium
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Project’s major economic development initiatives is marketing Hartford to young professionals
as a desirable place to live.562 Rightly or wrongly, the young professional, or “yuppie”, is often
associated with gentrification and their decision to use those words exactly would suggest that
the group is okay with that. At the same time, Hartford’s Neighborhood Revitalization Zones
(NRZ’s), recently created by state legislation, were meant to represent community interests and
in many cases were more interested in building local potential than attracting it from the
outside.563

Present decade: slow, cautious progress
The most recent decade has been much less eventful than the two that immediately
preceded it, at least in terms of political intrigue and economic volatility. Surprisingly, even the
2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis seems to have had a relatively muted effect compared to the
recession of the early 1990’s.564 Since that world-economy threatening calamity, the United
States has experienced an abnormally prolonged period of, admittedly slow and unequal, growth.
Thus, it is worth wondering how much of Hartford’s positive developments over the past decade
will survive the next economic downturn. As the 1990’s made clear, a particularly bad recession
prompted by the failure of key industries can lead to an overall collapse of Hartford’s economic
fortunes.
A more perennial and local economic concern that has become particularly acute is
government debt and the budgetary constraints that come with it. Hartford’s finances have long
been problematic, and complaints about the over-dependence on the property tax are an indirect

562

Ibid. 63
Ibid. 5, 94
564
Hartford (Conn.). Planning and Zoning Commission. One City, One Plan. Hartford, CT: City of
Hartford, Dept. of Development Services. 2011.
563

113

reflection of that.565 However, a little more than a year ago, the city was on the verge of
declaring bankruptcy.566 It only managed to avoid this by getting the state to agree to take on
Hartford’s debt as its own, in exchange for the city’s finances being put under state oversight.567
Notably, the state of Connecticut is hardly in a better position than Hartford when it comes to its
own debts, which are equally daunting and seemingly unpayable.568 Like Hartford, the state of
Connecticut has had to raise taxes several times in quick secession, only to find the politically
toxic move hardly makes a dent in the debt.569 Thus, it is hard to understand the economic sense
of assigning the debt of a city on the verge of bankruptcy to a state heading towards its own
fiscal crisis, other than that it is just kicking the can down the road.
The state takeover of Hartford’s debt is an interesting repeat of what happened with
Hartford’s school system in the mid-1990’s. Once again, the state was forced to step in when
Hartford found it could no longer carry out one of its basic functions as a local government.
Hartford’s failure to run its own school system or pay its own debt, while most likely caused in
part by actions made outside Hartford, nevertheless give the city and its government a bad
image. These state interventions also have the tendency to erode Hartford’s independence and
reinforce the idea that Hartford can only be saved from the outside.
The past nine years has seen two mayors of very different backgrounds come to the helm
of Hartford through very different means. First, Pedro Segarra, Hartford’s first openly gay
mayor, was unexpectedly elevated to the post after Eddie Perez’s conviction in 2010. He had
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been City Council President at the time and thus the first in line in the event the mayor could not
carry out his term.570 In order to restore public trust, he immediately asked for resignation letters
from all the city’s department heads, the Corporation Counsel and Perez’s chief of staff.571 He
did not intend to fire them all but felt changes needed to be made and this would allow him to do
so.572 Some of these changes would take place because of budgetary constraints as opposed to
creating a sense of accountability. Segarra merged several departments and placed them under
the same leadership structure so as to cut costs and shrink the number of people required to run
city departments.573 He further placed a hiring freeze on most city positions.574
One again, progress did not last long in Hartford and Segarra would face significant
criticism for a deal he had made, mostly without public input, to build a minor-league baseball
stadium for $60 million.575 At a time of fiscal crisis, betting so much on the success of a sports
stadium seemed incredibly irresponsible. It would be an issue that his challenger, Luke Bronin,
consistently emphasized.576 Beyond the expense of the project, it seemed as though Segarra was
making the deals without much public input or discussion.577 The timing probably was not well
thought out, either, as the decision to pay for the new stadium emerged in 2014,578 a year before
the next mayoral election, and all the uncertainty surrounding the stadium would only help his
political opponents. As it happened, Segarra’s eventual successor, Bronin, already had more
valuable allies than Segarra.
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Even though Segarra won an election in his own right in 2011, the Democratic Party
endorsed Luke Bronin in 2015 over him.579 This may have been a sign of how politically
damaging the stadium deal and subsequent issues were, but it is also true that Bronin was better
connected to political powers beyond Hartford. Immediately prior to running for mayor he had
been general counsel to then-governor Daniel Malloy.580 Segarra tried to paint Bronin as an
outsider and he had, in fact, only moved to Hartford in 2006 and lived a total of five years here
between then and the 2015 election. He had gone to Washington D.C. and Afghanistan for four
years as part of a former job fighting financial crime.581 Either Hartford voters are not as
distrustful of newcomers as they are made out to be or people had grown so sick of Segarra that
his background was less important. In any event, Bronin became mayor in 2015 and continues to
serve at the time of this writing. He has had to deal with some of the aftermath of the stadium
deal and the proposed projects for the surrounding area, known as Downtown North (DoNo).
The original developers, hired during Segarra’s tenure, were fired in 2016 for failing to reach
multiple deadlines and cost overruns.582 The city then awarded development rights for the DoNo
area to another developer,583 prompting Centerplan to sue for alleged breach of contract.584
While the case is in the courts, Hartford cannot actually develop the land, and thus the mess of
this project continues into the present day.
The 2011 Plan of Conservation and Development
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Despite being published in 2011 during Pedro Segarra’s time in office, the Plan of
Conservation and Development (POCD) is likely more reflective of the economic strategies of
the Perez administration, assuming they differed at all. This is because work on the plan began in
2006 and would thus have been largely finished by the time Segarra became mayor in 2010.585
The plan is distinct for being the only Plan of Development produced since the Planning and
Zoning Commission took on the role of the Commission on the City Plan. It also evidently has a
greater focus on sustainability, as the addition of conservation to the name suggests, and the plan
itself states.586 While it was created early in Segarra’s term, and long before Bronin’s, the plan is
explicitly meant to guide Hartford’s development through 2020 and thus, with some
amendments, should be representative of the broader economic strategies for the whole
decade.587
The plan is perhaps the most openly welcoming of gentrification as an economic strategy
of them all. One of the goals is to develop Hartford’s “Creative Economy.”588 This strongly
indicates that the city’s planning leadership bought into Richard Florida’s development theories.
Importantly, his theories focus on attracting a desired group of “creative” people, and convincing
them to move into cities.589 What gives away that he is basically advocating gentrification is that
he considers the ability to attract gay people and so-called bohemians to be key for the
revitalization of cities.590 These are two groups commonly associated with engaging in or
initiating wider gentrification.591,592 It is also unlikely that the Planning and Zoning Commission
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was not referring to his specific conception of the Creative Economy because it is written with
capital letters as though it were a proper noun, not just a generic concept.593 Moreover, two of the
means by which the Commission intended to develop the Creative Economy was by encouraging
residential development that appealed to artists and young business professionals and promoting
the growth of the arts community around colleges in Hartford.594
Downtown is clearly ground zero for the city’s efforts to gentrify the city. Not only is it
the site of decades of other revitalization attempts, from Constitution Plaza to Adriaen’s
Landing, it also lacks a sizeable neighborhood population that could be displaced or resist the
encroachment of gentrification.595 Evidently, many of the people who did live in Downtown at
the time were young professionals who moved there within the previous decade.596 The plan
suggests that no less than 6,000 to 8,000 additional residents will be needed for Downtown to
become self-sustaining.597 Among the desired population for Downtown are college students and
even more young professionals.598 Admittedly, the plan does say that including an affordable
housing requirement could be created to address the fact that residents of Hartford’s
neighborhoods are almost uniformly incapable of affording Downtown housing.599 Still, it begs
the question why every Downtown housing development built in the previous decade was only
for market-rate housing.600 Considering that young professionals came to occupy many of these
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new units, it would seem like a somewhat belated concern to suggest, only as a possibility, that
10% of units in new developments be set aside for affordable housing.601
The POCD makes an interesting break with the 1996 plan. It is made all the more
peculiar by the fact that it repeats, almost verbatim but with a critical difference, an important
finding of the previous plan. When the 1996 Plan of Development said Hartford was no longer a
“company town” it added that, “Growth must come from multiple sources-small firms and
neighborhood economies-not monolithic corporations.”602 By contrast, the POCD also states that
Hartford is no longer a “company town” but follows with “future growth will come from
multiple sources, including small firms and neighborhood economies (emphasis added).”603 This
is a rather significant modification of the earlier statement and suggests a city far more open to
the corporations that the 1996 Commission seemed so hostile towards. They excised the
derogatory “monolithic corporation” comment and reduced small firms and neighborhood
economies to a supporting role instead of an essential one. Their decision to simultaneously
evoke the past plan while sending a substantially different message comes across as a deliberate
statement of changed values.
In another instance of similarities with the 1996 plan, the POCD is concerned that
Hartford’s economy is not diversified enough.604 This time, the two plans are much more aligned
on objectives and the three sectors the POCD hopes to attract are scientific/technical services,
medical, arts and entertainment.605 It is interesting that, in a city with such a large low-skilled
population, the Planning and Zoning Commission wants to tether the city’s economic fortunes to
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industries most residents could not participate in. The Commission does state that it is important
to get Hartford residents the education required to obtain jobs in the new industries, but it would
seem like the pace of development would be faster than the pace of a broken education
system.606 Moreover, since education is a separate department they have no control over, the
Commission usually just ends up recommending job training programs in any instance where
they actually address the mismatch between the jobs they’re trying to create and the skills of the
people who actually live in the city.607 Job training is proposed in practically every Plan of
Development, which does not build confidence that it is an effective way to address the problem.
Despite an apparent move towards more gentrification friendly strategies, it does not
appear as though gentrification was occurring outside of Downtown. The size of the nonHispanic white population is often a good indicator of gentrifying neighborhoods, particularly
when it grows substantially. It would be a particularly good indicator in Hartford, where the
percentage of the minority population in the city, 76%, is roughly the same as the white
percentage in the metropolitan region, 77%.608 It would have to be a very peculiar circumstance
for suburbanites to move into Hartford in large numbers and not increase the size of the white
population. However, the data shows Hartford’s white population was still in decline in 2011.609
The only neighborhoods that had even a plurality white population were the West End, South
West and Downtown.610 The former two neighborhoods are peripheral neighborhoods that have
long had some of the best, single family housing in Hartford and are directly adjacent to West
Hartford, the city’s much whiter and wealthier neighbor. However, the city’s development of
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Downtown could have a significant impact on the future of gentrification in Hartford if they
succeed in creating a residential population of 8,000 to 10,000 people.611 This will also depend
on what the eventual make-up of that population will be, as of now it is substantially whiter and
wealthier than most Hartford neighborhoods.612
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Conclusion
The story of Hartford thus far, from the 1950’s to the present, has been of a city willing to
try anything to maintain, or reclaim, a position of economic superiority in the region. Many
scholars make it seem as though the most important difference between places that gentrify and
places that don’t is resistance to gentrification in the latter.613 Yet, unless gentrification is in
Hartford’s near future, the past 20 years of more or less gentrification-friendly development
policies in Hartford would seem to disprove that local policy has a determinative effect on the
presence of gentrification. Rather, the barriers to gentrification in Hartford would appear to lie
outside of City Hall and in some cases outside the city itself.
First, Hartford’s position relative to its suburbs has been inimical to its growth for
decades. While Hartford was not alone in facing competition from suburbs, white flight and the
host of other mid-twentieth century ills that afflicted urban areas, its desire from as early as the
1950’s was greater regional governance. Yet, invariably, what regional activity has occurred has
not actually empowered Hartford as a city. Frankly, it should not be surprising that this has been
the case because even advocates of regionalism in Hartford claim “Localism and regionalism do
not have to be mutually exclusive goals.”614 Thus, in the spirit of maintaining Connecticut’s
proud local traditions,615 and recognizing the political infeasibility of anything else, the city of
Hartford has never sought or been offered the chance to actually lead and guide a regional
development entity. Regional entities that have formed in the Hartford region are either overseen
by the state of Connecticut or unelected private interests that are feeling philanthropic. As the
plans make clear, state agencies alone have thwarted the development of at least two major
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transportation projects that the Commission viewed as critical. When it comes to corporate
development, the Greater Hartford Process’ grandiose plan to bring urbanism to the suburbs
before starting any major projects in Hartford was a monumental mistake with potentially
significant consequences. Had millions of dollars been poured into Hartford’s neighborhoods,
instead of buying up plots of land in Coventry, the face of several neighborhoods could have
been radically changed. Instead, the great achievement of the Process was a Downtown
entertainment complex directed towards suburban consumption whose roof collapsed a few years
after opening.
At times, regional interventions also directly undermined Hartford’s power and
autonomy, even if the city technically asked for it to occur. This has actually accelerated
somewhat in recent decades as some of Hartford’s problems have grown truly unmanageable
from decades of neglect and inadequate resources. It is not a good look for a city to have such a
poorly functioning education system that it has to ask the state to take over the responsibility.
Then, just last year, the city was saved from having to declare bankruptcy by getting the state to
take on its debt in exchange for what is effectively financial probation. These public episodes of
government failure reinforce the perception that Hartford’s problems are a result of the city
government’s mismanagement or incompetence and make it even less likely that suburbanites
would ever agree to a situation that gave Hartford power or influence over the suburbs.
Normally, such significant economic declines might cause a rent-gap to occur and
gentrification to follow, but the evidence points to Hartford having a particularly poor housing
stock that simply cannot attract gentrification. It is fairly incredible that, after one of the worst
recessions in Hartford’s history, in which housing prices plummeted nationwide, much of
Hartford’s housing stock could not be bought, rehabilitated and resold for a profit. Without a
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rent-gap, or government support covering the costs of rehabilitation, the crucial financial
incentive for large scale, private rehabilitation simply does not exist. Therefore, as long as this
remains true, the only gentrification that will occur in Hartford will be for non-economic reasons.
It is not an unheard-of phenomenon, but gentrification that occurs at a large enough scale to be
neighborhood-altering tends to be driven by economic forces.
Lastly, economic recessions have certainly undermined Hartford’s economy at critical
moments in its development. First, the mid-1970’s recession put the last nail in the coffin of the
Greater Hartford Process, easily the most ambitious and underwhelming revitalization effort in
Hartford’s history. It is impossible to know for sure whether the Process would have done
anything more substantial had it continued. In Hartford, like in so many cities across the nation,
the hostility to gentrification and elite development projects was not just strong but mobilized. It
is in this instance that consciously anti-gentrification actions could arguably be said to have
prevented its occurrence in Hartford. However, this does not explain why, unlike many of the
neighborhoods that successfully resisted gentrification in the 1970’s and 1980’s, none of
Hartford’s neighborhoods gentrified in the 1990’s, when opposition to such developments
weakened.
In this case, once again, it was economic recession that really put an end to any
possibility of Hartford becoming gentrified. The significance of the 1990’s recession cannot be
overemphasized in Hartford’s history. Indeed, as the recession that inaugurated the current wave
of gentrification, it is significant in gentrification history in general. The bizarre reality of
Hartford prior to the 1990’s, in which the Downtown economy grew thanks to white-collar,
suburban employment while the neighborhoods declined, came to an abrupt an unceremonious
end with the virtual collapse of Hartford’s major industries. The early 1990’s made the 1970’s
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look good by comparison, at least the city had a wide array of anchor institutions at the time.
Others have since filled in for the role played by the former “bishops,” among them Trinity
College and the State of Connecticut, but they are far more financially constrained than a group
of large financial and insurance firms.
Notably, the recession of the 1990’s essentially forced Hartford to reinvent its economic
niche. City leaders could not rely on those industries that remained in Downtown because they
had proven to be sensitive to market downturns. Briefly, there was a moment when city
leadership put more faith in the neighborhood economies than they did in Downtown. However,
Hartford’s efforts of the past 20 years or so have been directed at attracting new development,
and new people, to a Downtown it hopes to remake into a residential neighborhood again. Thus,
Hartford is largely left to hope that, despite not being known for its medical or technology
industries, businesses in those fields will relocate here if properly incentivized. Hence, as of this
writing, gentrification appears to be the main way Hartford’s leaders expect to restore Hartford’s
economic position.
Limitations and further research
Naturally, this thesis cannot provide the definitive answer to what impedes gentrification
in so many old, industrial cities. Time and logistical constraints simply made it too difficult to
perform some of the research I would have liked to perform. First and foremost, future studies
seeking to address this issue should try to engage in a comparative study of a city that has not
gentrified with a relatively similar city that has. One possibility that could build off of this paper
is comparing Hartford to New Haven, which has improved relative to Hartford in recent years. It
would also be valuable to compare neighborhoods that have not gentrified in otherwise gentrified
cities to neighborhoods in cities that have seen no gentrification at all.
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It was difficult to determine which sources to rely on as a proxy for the City of Hartford’s
views on development. It is likely that this paper could be improved upon by using a wider
variety of sources from other agencies involved in development, such as the Hartford Housing
Authority and the Hartford Redevelopment Authority. Admittedly, part of the difficulty was the
sheer quantity of agencies that could conceivably have some relation to economic development
and the number of reports they would have produced over a 70-year period. Since the Plans of
Development were meant to be comprehensive, long-term plans, I relied on them even though
they are advisory and the ones from 1955 and 1972 were not adopted by the City Council. There
may be other plans I am not aware of that had a better track record for being carried out and also
addressed development somewhat broadly.
Unfortunately, I was also unable to get a sense of how Hartford’s current leadership
really felt about gentrification explicitly because I did not perform interviews. The plans tend to
be coy around the term gentrification and one is left to guess whether they really see their goals
as something distinct from gentrification or whether they are simply avoiding the term because it
is politically toxic. Getting a sense of how Hartford’s leaders view the prospect of gentrification,
and what they understand that term to mean, would be valuable in assessing my finding that they
are currently trying to advance gentrification
Policy Recommendations
Part of the difficulty with making a policy recommendation regarding gentrification is
that, unlike crime for instance, there is no consensus on whether it is better to have more or less
of it. However, since the City is already pursuing a development strategy that is geared towards
gentrification, even if it will not use the exact word, my recommendation will for avoiding
gentrification while encouraging economic growth. Admittedly, this is a daunting task and it may
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be that, realistically, there is no way for Hartford to grow economically without experiencing
some amount of gentrification. Certainly, as a city that is over 80% non-white, any significant
economic growth would likely cause that statistic to shrink considerably.
Crucially, Hartford’s education system needs improvement. That is not a groundbreaking
statement but if Hartford is going to be a city with a healthy middle-income population, without
experiencing gentrification, a decent high school education is the bare minimum that Hartford’s
current residents need. An affordable and adequate college education would also be necessary
but that is out of the city’s control. The middle-class was first created in cities but they have
evidently lost or forgotten the ability to create it in today’s economic conditions. They have
become accustomed instead to attracting already middle-income populations from suburbs and
other cities while those that lose this competition for people simply sink into increasing poverty.
If Hartford wants to avoid gentrification it will have to stop looking for outsiders to save it and
start focusing on building up its own population.
However, my main recommendation for Hartford would be to advocate for a regional
governing body that it actually leads. This body would have to have the ability to allocate
resources and engage in regional planning that its members actually have to comply with. Of
course, suburban governments would be immediately hostile to the idea, but expecting them to
come around on this issue without any pressure is not supported by historical precedent. Hartford
is the capital city of the state and the economic center of the Hartford region, despite all that has
befallen it. Aside from historical accident and parochialism, it makes no sense why Hartford
should have to be subordinate to its suburbs. This would not be a regional dictatorship and
Hartford’s powers would be much less than absolute. However, if Hartford’s leaders are truly
interested in creating an economic revival in the city then the detrimental activities occurring in
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the suburbs need to be addressed. Regional governance would make it possible for people to
experience the benefit of many towns’ shared resources without having to move to those towns.
Thus, if and when an economic revival occurred in Hartford as a result of a better allocation of
resources, suburbanites would not feel compelled to actually move to Hartford to benefit from
the gains being made. Therefore, economic growth could occur within Hartford’s boundaries
without gentrification and displacement.
.
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